VoLTE and SRTP

Wed Mar 9 00:32:07 UTC 2022

Don't need to break phone to tower encryption when the vast majority of the
call pathway is not encrypted.

On Tue, Mar 8, 2022 at 4:59 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:

>
> Hi, I was reading an article on why Russia hasn't taken out Ukraine's
> mobile networks and one of the premises was that they could use it to
> eavesdrop on calls. Depending on how old their infrastructure is, that
> doesn't make sense as I would assume that along with e2e SIP that they'd
> be using SRTP with the SRTP keys exchanged using DTLS which is my
> understanding of the way they are secured. My understanding could be
> wrong though, or either outdated, or not uniformly deployed.
>
> The other thing that's weird is that the same article says they want to
> keep it up so they can use their bandwidth too which strikes me as sort
> of a crazy assumption in a war, but that's not much of an operational
> issue.
>
>
> https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/07/ukraine-phones-internet-still-work-00014487
>
> Mike
>
>
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