VoLTE and SRTP

Wed Mar 9 00:47:02 UTC 2022

On 3/8/22 4:32 PM, Tom Beecher wrote:
> Don't need to break phone to tower encryption when the vast majority 
> of the call pathway is not encrypted.

If it's VoLTE I assume it would be sips:

Mike

>
>
> On Tue, Mar 8, 2022 at 4:59 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>
>
>     Hi, I was reading an article on why Russia hasn't taken out Ukraine's
>     mobile networks and one of the premises was that they could use it to
>     eavesdrop on calls. Depending on how old their infrastructure is,
>     that
>     doesn't make sense as I would assume that along with e2e SIP that
>     they'd
>     be using SRTP with the SRTP keys exchanged using DTLS which is my
>     understanding of the way they are secured. My understanding could be
>     wrong though, or either outdated, or not uniformly deployed.
>
>     The other thing that's weird is that the same article says they
>     want to
>     keep it up so they can use their bandwidth too which strikes me as
>     sort
>     of a crazy assumption in a war, but that's not much of an
>     operational issue.
>
>     https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/07/ukraine-phones-internet-still-work-00014487
>
>     Mike
>
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