mysidia at gmail.com
Fri Apr 6 13:13:22 CDT 2012
On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Nick Hilliard <nick at foobar.org> wrote:
> On 06/04/2012 18:41, Nathan Eisenberg wrote:
>> Anyone else seeing this sort of noise lately?
> There has been a bit of that recently for ripe.net and several other well
> known DNSSEC enabled domains (e.g. isc.org).
> It turns out that DNSSEC makes a respectable traffic amplification vector:
This is definitely a problem.
Unfortunately, what really should happen is DNSSEC should be revised, to,
either make sure that the client initiating the query has to either do more
work than the server, or make a round trip before the DNSSEC data can
One way of accomplishing that would be to indicate that DNSSEC data
can be transmitted only over DNS when using TCP; since a reflection
spoofer cannot complete
a 3-way TCP handshake, the attacker cannot send spoofed requests for DNSSEC
data over TCP.
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