Why are we still using the CA model? (Re: Microsoft deems all DigiNotar certificates untrustworthy, releases updates)
jasper at pointless.net
Mon Sep 12 21:08:23 UTC 2011
On Mon, 12 Sep 2011, Gregory Edigarov wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Sep 2011 12:12:08 +0200
> Martin Millnert <millnert at gmail.com> wrote:
> > Mike,
> > On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 8:44 PM, Mike Jones <mike at mikejones.in> wrote:
> > > It will take a while to get updated browsers rolled out to enough
> > > users for it do be practical to start using DNS based self-signed
> > > certificated instead of CA-Signed certificates, so why don't any
> > > browsers have support yet? are any of them working on it?
> > Chrome v 14 works with DNS stapled certificates, sort of a hack. (
> > http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/06/16/dnssecchrome.html )
> > There are other proposals/ideas out there, completely different to
> > DANE / DNSSEC, like http://perspectives-project.org/ /
> > http://convergence.io/ .
> I.e. instead of a set of trusted CAs there will be one distributed net
> of servers, that act as a cert storage?
> I do not see how that could help...
The point of perspectives and convergence is this. The browser says:
>From my point of view site X has a certificate with fingerprint Y, what do
you guys all see from your points of view?
If the perspectives/convergence servers see a different certificate then
you know that you are the victim of a mitm attack..
I.E. the perspectives and convergence system does not attempt to assert
anything about a sites identity, just that everyone sees the same cert for
(of course if the mitm is happening close enough to the site
networktopologicly speaking than all the perspectives/convergence servers
will see the same, fake, cert and your out of luck).
> Well, I do not even see how can one trust any certificate that is
> issued by commercial organization.
perspectives and convergence don't issue certs.
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