Why are we still using the CA model? (Re: Microsoft deems all DigiNotar certificates untrustworthy, releases updates)

Jimmy Hess mysidia at gmail.com
Mon Sep 12 23:02:27 UTC 2011

On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 6:23 AM, Gregory Edigarov
<greg at bestnet.kharkov.ua> wrote:
> I.e. instead of a set of trusted CAs there will be one distributed net
> of servers, that act as a cert storage?
> I do not see how that could help...
More lines of defense on top of the CA model.
Consider instead of abandoning the CA model altogether, you utilize
DNSSEC binding of the certificate
that must also be signed by a CA.

If _either_  the DNSSEC record isn't present,  doesn't validate,  OR
the certificate is not properly signed
by a CA,  then the certificate is considered invalid.

In this manner,   DNSSEC protects you against interception by a rogue
CA -- chances
are the rogue CA has not also discovered your DNSSEC secret keys,
and the  CA signature protects you against a compromise of the DNS, or an attack
by your domain registrar    --  your domain registrar is probably not
a CA and doesn't
have the right paperwork,
therefore can't get a CA signed certificate with your company's name.

The browsers then just need to revise their trust model  to require no
CA be affiliated with or
owned by any organization affiliated with a provider of domain
registration or DNS hosting services,
to ensure there's no domain registrar  entrusted to sign certs, and no
CA entrusted to maintain
DNSSEC data.


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