<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr"><br><blockquote type="cite">Am 12/7/22 um 22:25 schrieb Don Beal <don@depref.net>:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">How can RPKI / OV prevent such a leak when there is no ROA for <span style="color:rgb(80,0,80)">2000::/12,</span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>If all ASes participated, no „unknowns“, unknowns could be dropped, ….<div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><span style="color:rgb(80,0,80)"> what would </span>6762|2914|174|* invalidate against? Until a future where everything is 'valid', RPKI is unable to pare out less-specific conflicts.<div><br></div><div>It does look like 3356 pulled the announcement, which is good.<br><div><br></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Dec 8, 2022 at 4:48 AM Christopher Morrow <<a href="mailto:morrowc.lists@gmail.com">morrowc.lists@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Wed, Dec 7, 2022 at 11:25 PM Ryan Hamel <<a href="mailto:administrator@rkhtech.org" target="_blank">administrator@rkhtech.org</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> AS3356 has been announcing 2000::/12 for about 3 hours now, an aggregate covering over 23K prefixes (just over 25%) of the IPv6 DFZ.<br>
><br>
><br>
<br>
interesting that this is leaking outside supposed RPKI OV boundaries as well.<br>
For example:<br>
6762 3356<br>
2914 3356<br>
174 3356 (apologies to 174, I forget if they signed up to the 'doin<br>
ov now' plan)<br>
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