<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr">Except the pstn DB isn’t distributed like DNS is.</div><div dir="ltr"><br><blockquote type="cite">On Oct 4, 2022, at 2:40 PM, Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr">
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:CAJ_LqoEoCeGVfsHQg3XHd6eaOVwuZdPYTx_kC4MmCZ5pWuDs_g@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="ltr">Except the cost to do the data dips to
determine the authorization isn't "free".</div>
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<p>Since every http request in the universe requires a "database
dip" and they are probably a billion times more common, that
doesn't seem like a very compelling concern.</p>
<p>Mike<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:CAJ_LqoEoCeGVfsHQg3XHd6eaOVwuZdPYTx_kC4MmCZ5pWuDs_g@mail.gmail.com"><br>
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<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM
Michael Thomas <<a href="mailto:mike@mtcc.com" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">mike@mtcc.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
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<p><br>
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<div>On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)">I
think the point the other Mike was trying to make was
that if everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't
be a problem. Since some don't, something else needed to
be tried.<br>
<br>
<div><span name="x"></span><br>
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<p>Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who
is allowed to use what telephone numbers is an
administrative issue for the ingress provider to police.
It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof
whatever email address I want. The FCC could have required
that ages ago.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Mike<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:10pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<div><br>
-----<br>
Mike Hammett<br>
Intelligent Computing Solutions<br>
<a href="http://www.ics-il.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">http://www.ics-il.com</a><br>
<br>
Midwest-IX<br>
<a href="http://www.midwest-ix.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">http://www.midwest-ix.com</a><span name="x"></span><br>
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<hr id="m_5695148775473131614zwchr">
<div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-weight:normal;font-style:normal;text-decoration:none;font-family:Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><b>From:
</b>"Shane Ronan" <a href="mailto:shane@ronan-online.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"><shane@ronan-online.com></a><br>
<b>To: </b>"Michael Thomas" <a href="mailto:mike@mtcc.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"><mike@mtcc.com></a><br>
<b>Cc: </b><a href="mailto:nanog@nanog.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">nanog@nanog.org</a><br>
<b>Sent: </b>Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM<br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone
aren't enough (Robocalls)<br>
<br>
<div dir="ltr">The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I
accept from my customers, but which 'prefixes' I
accept from the people I peer with, because it's
entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip
on EVERY call, I have to assume that my peer or my
peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right
thing.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I can't simply block traffic from a peer
carrier, it's not allowed, so there has to be some
mechanism to mark that a prefix should be allowed,
which is what Shaken/Stir does.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Shane</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
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<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 3,
2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <<a href="mailto:mike@mtcc.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">mike@mtcc.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The problem has
always been solvable at the ingress provider. The
<br>
problem was that there was zero to negative
incentive to do that. You <br>
don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress
provider which prefixes <br>
customers are allow to assert. It's pretty
analogous to when submission <br>
authentication was pretty nonexistent with
email... there was no <br>
incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike
email spam, SIP <br>
signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's
spam. All it needed <br>
was somebody to force regulation which unlike
email there was always <br>
jurisdiction with the FCC.<br>
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:<br>
> We're talking about blocking other carriers.<br>
><br>
> On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <<a href="mailto:mike@mtcc.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">mike@mtcc.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
><br>
> On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:<br>
> > Because it's illegal for common
carriers to block traffic otherwise.<br>
><br>
> Wait, what? It's illegal to police their
own users?<br>
><br>
> Mike<br>
><br>
> ><br>
> > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on
behalf of Michael Thomas"
<nanog-bounces+jbazyar=<a href="mailto:verobroadband.com@nanog.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">verobroadband.com@nanog.org</a>
on behalf of <a href="mailto:mike@mtcc.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">mike@mtcc.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
> ><br>
> ><br>
> > On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean
Donelan wrote:<br>
> > > 'Fines alone aren't
enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice<br>
> > > providers for flouting
robocall rules<br>
> > ><br>
> > > <a href="https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/</a><br>
> > ><br>
> > > [...]<br>
> > > “This is a new era. If a
provider doesn’t meet its obligations under<br>
> > > the law, it now faces
expulsion from America’s phone networks. Fines<br>
> > > alone aren’t enough,” FCC
chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a<br>
> > > statement accompanying
the announcement. “Providers that don’t follow<br>
> > > our rules and make it
easy to scam consumers will now face swift<br>
> > > consequences.”<br>
> > ><br>
> > > It’s the first such
enforcement action by the agency to reduce the<br>
> > > growing problem of
robocalls since call ID verification protocols<br>
> > > known as “STIR/SHAKEN”
went fully into effect this summer.<br>
> > > [...]<br>
> ><br>
> > Why did we need to wait for
STIR/SHAKEN to do this?<br>
> ><br>
> > Mike<br>
> ><br>
><br>
><br>
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