<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Sep 18, 2018, at 11:06 AM, Christopher Morrow <<a href="mailto:morrowc.lists@gmail.com" class="">morrowc.lists@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><div dir="ltr" class=""><br class=""><br class=""><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="">On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:36 AM Job Snijders <<a href="mailto:job@ntt.net" class="">job@ntt.net</a>> wrote:<br class=""></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Owen,<br class="">
<br class="">
On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:23:42AM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:<br class="">
> Personally, since all RPKI accomplishes is providing a<br class="">
> cryptographically signed notation of origin ASNs that hijackers should<br class="">
> prepend to their announcements in order to create an aura of<br class="">
> credibility, I think we should stop throwing resources down this<br class="">
> rathole.<br class="">I think you underestimate how valuable RPKI based Origin Validation<br class="">
(even just by itself) is in today's Internet landscape.<br class="">
<br class="">
If you are aware of other efforts or more fruitful approaches please let<br class="">
us know.<br class="">
<br class=""></blockquote><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Perhaps said another way: </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">"How would you figure out what prefixes your bgp peer(s) should be sending you?"<br class=""> (in an automatable, and verifiable manner)</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">-chris<br class=""></div></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=""><div class="">In theory, that’s what IRRs are for.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">In practice, while they offer better theoretical capabilities if stronger authentication were added, the current implementation and acceptance leaves much to be desired.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">However, even in theory, RPKI offers nothing of particular benefit even in its best case of widespread implementation.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Owen</div><div class=""><br class=""></div></body></html>