ROAs Expire

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at gmail.com
Tue Jan 3 16:01:33 UTC 2023


On Tue, Jan 3, 2023 at 10:53 AM John Curran <jcurran at istaff.org> wrote:

> Mike -
>
> A friendlier RPKI system would allow you to delegate/authorize the
> automatic action of refreshing your RPKI ROA’s when they are close to
> expiration.
>
> ARIN’s current RPKI system does not provide this (we literally cannot
> under the present schema as we never possess the private key that’s
> necessary for our HSM to perform a ROA generation on your behalf) – but
> other RIRs RPKI systems are built differently and have this functionality
> today in their hosted RPKI systems.
>
> After frequent user requests in this area – along with some requests that
> are related regarding user-interface improvements – we will be moving to a
> hosted RPKI environment that supports automatic ROA rollovers later this
> year.  (Note - as a result of this change, folks who want strong assurance
> of non-repudiation of ROA generation should consider delegated or hybrid
> RPKI setups.)
>
>
>
To clarify, your last paragraph:
  today ARIN has an HSM, for parts of the work, but requires that the user
(me, mike, jared) hold our
  private key(s) used to sign objects locally. this means that ARIN never
sees the private key material.
  a private key would be required to be visible/accessible to ARIN's
system(s) in order to auto-update
  a ROA(s) in such a new system.

  Further, the future system (that will enable auto-update of ROA) will
need access to the private key
  material. This means that POSSIBLY ARIN or a bad-actor may be able to use
that private key material
  for bad deeds. (note I'm not saying ARIN is a bad actor, nor that they
want to do bad things)
  So folks that need/want to be more assured that their private key
material is 'safe' will need to move
  off the ARIN Hosted deployment prior to the new system coming alive.

Maybe that's all super clear to everyone else, but :) sometimes more words
are more better/clear.


> Thanks (and Happy Holidays!)
> /John
>
> John Curran
> President and CEO
> American Registry for Internet Numbers
>
> On Jan 3, 2023, at 10:42 AM, Mike Hammett <nanog at ics-il.net> wrote:
>
> Nothing went south for me, just got an email from ARIN reminding me that
> they were about to expire.
>
> The reasons you stated all make sense. We'll just have to make sure it's
> easy enough for the less skilled or more busy operators to comply with
> current best practices, lest they not do it at all to avoid the hassle.
>
>
>
> -----
> Mike Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions <http://www.ics-il.com/>
> <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL>
> <https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb>
> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions>
> <https://twitter.com/ICSIL>
> Midwest Internet Exchange <http://www.midwest-ix.com/>
> <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix>
> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange>
> <https://twitter.com/mdwestix>
> The Brothers WISP <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/>
> <https://www.facebook.com/thebrotherswisp>
> <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg>
> ------------------------------
> *From: *"Jared Mauch" <jared at puck.nether.net>
> *To: *"Mike Hammett" <nanog at ics-il.net>
> *Cc: *"NANOG" <nanog at nanog.org>
> *Sent: *Tuesday, January 3, 2023 9:39:10 AM
> *Subject: *Re: ROAs Expire
>
> On Tue, Jan 03, 2023 at 08:56:28AM -0600, Mike Hammett wrote:
> > ROAs expire. Creating new ones doesn't seem to be terribly difficult,
> but why do they expire in the first place?
>
>         There's several reasons I can see why one would want this:
>
> 1) to ensure that proper care is maintained over the IP space, domains,
> certificiates (ROA is a certificiate), etc expire and require renewal.
>
> 2) If there's a new cipher algo flaw or similar, it may become necessary
> to rotate things.
>
> 3) to help avoid some of the problems that exist with unmaintained IRR
> objects.
>
>         There's more I'm sure, but this is one of the reasons that I
> personally have been hesitatant to roll out some tools, eg: DNSSEC
> (which suffers from a variety of ciphers and for some cases lack of
> ability to publish to parents - i think this was largely resolved).
>
>         With this increased security also comes to increased fragility,
> which I suspect is what you are writing about, something likely broke
> for you or someone else due to lack of checking the status of the ROA
> expiration.
>
>         This has happened in the past with domains, including big name
> ones, so having something setup (eg: roa watch, similar to x509watch on
> *nix systems) would be appropriate.
>
>         I'm sure others can refer to tools or services that can do this,
> but it's always a good idea to check your objects and watch when they go
> away or expire.
>
>         - Jared
>
> --
> Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from jared at puck.nether.net
> clue++;      | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only
> mine.
>
>
>
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