[External] Normal ARIN registration service fees for LRSA entrants after 31 Dec 2023 (was: Fwd: [arin-announce] Availability of the Legacy Fee Cap for New LRSA Entrants Ending as of 31 December 2023)
beecher at beecher.cc
Sat Sep 17 15:18:45 UTC 2022
I would honestly love it if IANA was able to say "As of X date, all LEGACY
IPv4 allocations are transferred to the RIRs . Assignees will not change,
but will now need to comply with each RIRs policies."
Of course this will never happen, because it would just be a flood of
billable hours, lawsuits, and injunctions, where companies will claim
'intellectual property' over something they didn't develop.
It's exhausting to watch this two tiered system where the legacy holders
bleat about what the rules should be for the rest of us, while they can do
whatever the heck they want, simply because they had the foresight to exist
at the right time.
On Sat, Sep 17, 2022 at 10:41 AM John Curran <jcurran at arin.net> wrote:
> On 16 Sep 2022, at 10:11 PM, John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> wrote:
> John Curran <jcurran at arin.net> wrote:
> ... the long-term direction is to provide the same services to all
> customers under the same agreement and fees – anything else wouldn’t
> be equitable.
> There are many "anything else"s that would indeed be equitable. It is
> equitable for businesses to sell yesterday's bread at a lower price than
> today's bread. Or to rent unused hotel rooms to late-night transients
> for lower prices than those charged to people who want pre-booked
> certainty about their overnight shelter. ARIN could equitably charge
> different prices to people in different situations; it already does.
> And ARIN could equitably offer services to non-members, by charging them
> transaction fees for services rendered, rather than trying to force them
> into a disadvantageous long term contract. Please don't confuse
> "seeking equity" with "forcing everyone into the same procrustean bed".
> John -
> ARIN can most certainly charge different fees for different customers –
> we’re actually doing
> exactly that today for all of the legacy resource holders who have entered
> an agreement
> with ARIN already or who choose to do so in the coming year. Rather than
> paying the
> same registration service fees as everyone else, they have a cap on their
> total registry
> maintenance fees (presently $150 per year, subject to an increase $25 per
> year) which
> is a unique fee benefit that’s been provided only to the legacy resource
> holders. The
> announcement just made is that we will cease offering this fee cap for
> legacy resource
> holders who sign an agreement after 31 Dec 2023; i.e. they will pay the
> same fees as
> everyone else based on total resources held.
> As others have already noted, this will move ARIN towards charging more
> customers the
> same fees for the same services. If you are a legacy resource holder that
> was planning
> on entering into an LRSA with ARIN, it would be beneficial to do so before
> 2024. If you
> are legacy resource holder that is not planning to enter an agreement with
> ARIN, then
> the change doesn’t matter to you (other than perhaps a providing an
> opportunity to rail
> on the mailing list in response anyway…)
> As a simple example, ARIN's contract need not require its customers to
> give up their resources when ceasing to pay ARIN for services. (There's
> an existence proof: RIPE's doesn't.) Such a contract would likely
> result in more-equitable sharing of costs, since it would encourage
> legacy holders to pay ARIN (and legacy holders are still more than a
> quarter of the total IP addresses, possibly much more). The fact that
> ARIN hasn't made this happen says nothing about equity; it's about
> something else.
> A wonderful assertion, but false. Those issued resource before ARIN’s
> formation have
> a choice – if they wish to enter an agreement and normalize their
> relationship they can
> do so, but at that point they are subject to the same agreement as
> everyone else. ARIN
> has made a conscious decision to treat everyone the same, both in terms of
> and fees (aside from the legacy resource holder fee cap that has been
> provided for last
> two decades as an incentive and, as noted, is being sunset at the end of
> Note that there are indeed circumstances where a party can exit the RSA
> and the number
> resources return to the prior status – this is what occurs if ARIN is
> found in litigation to have
> breached the agreement.
> This whole tussle is about power. ARIN wants the power to take away
> legacy resources, while their current owners don't want that to happen.
> If that the goal were "take away legacy resources”, then there are far
> easier and more
> direct means to accomplish that, but as noted previously, the goal is
> rather provide legacy
> resource holders a choice if they want a formal relationship with ARIN or
> not. Enter into
> an LRSA or don’t, that’s entirely up to each legacy resource holder.
> ARIN wants to be the puppeteer who pulls all the strings for the North
> American Internet. It pursues this desire by stealth and misdirection
> (e.g. "We strongly encourage all legacy resource holders who have not
> yet signed an LRSA to cover their legacy resources to consider doing so
> before 31 December 2023 in order to secure the most favorable fees for
> their ARIN Services...")
> ARIN certainly encourages legacy resource holders to enter an agreement -
> this helps
> spread our costs among a larger customer base and provides the customer
> access to
> our full suite of services – I’m not sure how that encouragement is seen
> as "stealth and
> misdirection”, particularly as we go out of our way to communicate changes
> well in
> advance and in forums such as this one.
> ARIN is also trying to encourage ISPs to
> demand RPKI before providing transit to IP address holders, which would
> turn its optional RPKI service (that it has tied by contract into ARIN
> gaining control over legacy resources) into an effectively mandatory
> RPKI service.
> Again, ARIN encourages operators to deploy RPKI services to better protect
> network routing, but we are very clear to take no stance on _requiring_
> of such services – this is matter best left for the operator community to
> ARIN hides its power grab behind "our policies are set by our community"
> and "our board is elected by our community" misdirections. Its voting
> community consists almost entirely of those who aren't legacy holders
> (by definition: if you accept their contract, your legacy resource
> ownership goes away; if you don't, you can't vote).
> Almost accurate - the voting community is indeed those customers who have
> under services agreement (i.e. members) and therefore that does not
> include legacy
> resource holders unless they opt to enter an LRSA. That voting community
> does elect
> the ARIN Board of Trustees and our ARIN Advisory Council.
> However, the ARIN policy development process is open to all, and there are
> many participants
> who have legacy resources not under agreement and advocate on behalf of
> that community –
> again, it’s your choice is you wish to participate or not, but it would be
> specious to assert that
> the community that develops ARIN registry policy is limited to ARIN
> That community
> would love to confiscate some "underused" legacy IP addresses to be
> handed out for free to their own "waiting list". So this is equivalent
> to putting foxes in charge of policy for a henhouse.
> Wow - I’m not certain you could be more incorrect. Note that the
> policies that were in
> effect _prior to ARIN’s formation_ reflect exactly that sentiment above:
> i.e., per RFC 2050 –
> IP addresses are valid as long as the criteria continues to be met.
> The IANA reserves the right to invalidate any IP assignments once it
> is determined the the requirement for the address space no longer
> exists. In the event of address invalidation, reasonable efforts
> will be made by the appropriate registry to inform the organization
> that the addresses have been returned to the free pool of IPv4
> address space.
> The community in this region (via ARIN’s policy development process)
> created registry policies
> that specifically recognize that “underused" IP address space is not
> subject to reclamation but
> can be transferred to another party that has need. (You can find these
> in ARIN’s number resource
> policy manual (NRPM) in section 8) <
> ARIN has also enshrined that same principle of ability to retain
> “underused number resources”
> in its RSA/LRSA, in section 6 –
> *6. REVIEW OF HOLDER’S NUMBER RESOURCES*
> *Whenever a transfer or additional IP address space is requested by
> Holder, ARIN may review Holder’s utilization of previously allocated or
> assigned number resources and other Services received from ARIN to
> determine if Holder is complying with the Service Terms. Except as set
> forth in this Agreement, (i) ARIN will take no action to reduce the
> Services currently provided for Included Number Resources due to lack of
> utilization by the Holder, and (ii) ARIN has no right to revoke any
> Included Number Resources under this Agreement due to lack of utilization
> by Holder. However, ARIN may refuse to permit transfers or additional
> allocations of number resources to Holder if Holder’s Included Number
> Resources are not utilized in accordance with Policy.*
> Now that markets exist for IP addresses, all that IP addresses need is a
> deed-registry to discourage fraud, like a county real-estate registrar's
> office. IP addresses no longer need a bureacracy for socialistic
> determinations about which supplicants "deserve" addresses.
> That’s pretty much what ARIN’s policies have evolved into, although we do
> still at present
> have a requirement that the recipient of an address block during a
> transfer have operational
> need (i.e. they’re going to be used in an actual network at some point.)
> If you don’t like that
> constraint, you can whine about it here on the nanog mailing list, or you
> can join others of
> similar mind working in the ARIN policy development process – I actually
> don’t care either
> way; ARIN operates the registry per the policy but leaves the development
> of registry policy
> to the community.
> Addresses now have prices, and if you want some, you buy them. Deed
> registries get to charge fees for transactions, but they don't get to take
> your property, nor tell you that you can't buy any more property because
> they disapprove of how you managed your previous properties. Actual
> ownership of real estate is defined by contracts and courts, not by the
> registry, which is just a set of pointers to help people figure out the
> history and current status of each parcel. The registry is important,
> but it's not definitive.
> Agreed regarding contracts and courts - if you have an RSA with ARIN, you
> have contract
> and your IP address block is a specific set of contractual rights that
> civil, criminal, probate,
> bankruptcy and other courts all seem to have no problem understanding and
> dealing with
> under rule of law. Absent such, I think you’ll find courts to be an
> interesting place indeed.
> Deed-registry is apparently not a model that ARIN wants to be operating
> in. They initially tried to refuse to record purchases of address
> blocks, because it violated their model of "if you don't use your IP
> addresses, you must give them back to us and receive no money for them".
> Factually incorrect. We never refused to transfer address blocks from one
> party to
> another _if the transfer met the policies set by the community_. It was
> actually the
> ARIN community that established the first number resource transfer policy
> in 2009
> <https://www.arin.net/vault/announcements/2009/20090601_nrpm.html> and
> was done at the encouragement of the ARIN Board of Trustees…. (please
> let’s try
> to stick with facts so an to keep the discussion here occurring on an
> informed basis.)
> They saw their job as being the power broker who hands out free favors.
> But when their supply of free IP addresses dried up, they had no
> remaining function other than to record ownership (be a deed registry),
> and to run an occasional conference. It dawned on them that if they
> refused to record these transactions, they would not even be a reliable
> deed-registry; they would have entirely outlived their usefulness.
> As noted, the above is completely specious; the ARIN Board and the
> community developed
> our registry policies for transfers to unrelated parties ahead of the
> first transactions.
> Sothey reluctantly agreed to do that job, but their policies are still
> left over from their power-broker past. They'd love to go back to it,
> if only they could figure out how. IPv6? Sure! RPKI maybe? Worth a
> ARIN prefers to be a power broker rather than a scribe. Who can blame
> them for that? But don't mistake their strategy for stewardship.
> "Doing what the community wants" or "seeking the equitable thing" quacks
> like stewardship, so of course they brand themselves that way. But
> in my opinion their power-seeking is self-serving, not community-serving.
> John - if you don’t like ARIN policies, I’d suggest that you join the
> others in the policy
> development process working to change them. ARIN makes sure that there’s
> and transparent policy development process, leaves the community to set
> policies, and then we operate the registry accordingly. That’s what we
> define as
> stewardship" of the number registry.
> John Curran
> President and CEO
> American Registry for Internet Numbers
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