FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
Michael Thomas
mike at mtcc.com
Tue Oct 4 18:40:40 UTC 2022
On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
> Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization
> isn't "free".
Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip" and
they are probably a billion times more common, that doesn't seem like a
very compelling concern.
Mike
>
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
>> I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if
>> everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem.
>> Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.
>>
>>
> Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed
> to use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the
> ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not
> allowing me to spoof whatever email address I want. The FCC could
> have required that ages ago.
>
>
> Mike
>
>>
>> -----
>> Mike Hammett
>> Intelligent Computing Solutions
>> http://www.ics-il.com
>>
>> Midwest-IX
>> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> *From: *"Shane Ronan" <shane at ronan-online.com>
>> <mailto:shane at ronan-online.com>
>> *To: *"Michael Thomas" <mike at mtcc.com> <mailto:mike at mtcc.com>
>> *Cc: *nanog at nanog.org
>> *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
>> *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
>>
>> The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but
>> which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, because
>> it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY
>> call, I have to assume that my peer or my peers customer or my
>> peers peer is doing the right thing.
>>
>> I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not
>> allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark that a prefix
>> should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does.
>>
>> Shane
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>>
>> The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider.
>> The
>> problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do
>> that. You
>> don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider
>> which prefixes
>> customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when
>> submission
>> authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no
>> incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP
>> signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All
>> it needed
>> was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was
>> always
>> jurisdiction with the FCC.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>> On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
>> > We're talking about blocking other carriers.
>> >
>> > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
>> > > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block
>> traffic otherwise.
>> >
>> > Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
>> >
>> > Mike
>> >
>> > >
>> > > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael
>> Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com at nanog.org on
>> behalf of mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
>> > > > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to
>> blacklist voice
>> > > > providers for flouting robocall rules
>> > > >
>> > > >
>> https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
>> > > >
>> > > > [...]
>> > > > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t
>> meet its obligations under
>> > > > the law, it now faces expulsion from
>> America’s phone networks. Fines
>> > > > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica
>> Rosenworcel said in a
>> > > > statement accompanying the announcement.
>> “Providers that don’t follow
>> > > > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers
>> will now face swift
>> > > > consequences.”
>> > > >
>> > > > It’s the first such enforcement action by the
>> agency to reduce the
>> > > > growing problem of robocalls since call ID
>> verification protocols
>> > > > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect
>> this summer.
>> > > > [...]
>> > >
>> > > Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
>> > >
>> > > Mike
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
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