FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

Shane Ronan shane at ronan-online.com
Tue Oct 4 18:21:41 UTC 2022


Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't
"free".

On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:

>
> On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
>
> I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone
> policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem. Since some don't,
> something else needed to be tried.
>
>
> Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use
> what telephone numbers is an administrative issue for the ingress provider
> to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof whatever
> email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
>
>
> Mike
>
>
> -----
> Mike Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions
> http://www.ics-il.com
>
> Midwest-IX
> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> ------------------------------
> *From: *"Shane Ronan" <shane at ronan-online.com> <shane at ronan-online.com>
> *To: *"Michael Thomas" <mike at mtcc.com> <mike at mtcc.com>
> *Cc: *nanog at nanog.org
> *Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
> *Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
>
> The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which
> 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with, because it's entirely
> dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume
> that my peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right
> thing.
>
> I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so
> there has to be some mechanism to mark that a prefix should be allowed,
> which is what Shaken/Stir does.
>
> Shane
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>
>> The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The
>> problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You
>> don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes
>> customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission
>> authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no
>> incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP
>> signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed
>> was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always
>> jurisdiction with the FCC.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>> On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
>> > We're talking about blocking other carriers.
>> >
>> > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >      On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
>> >      > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic
>> otherwise.
>> >
>> >      Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
>> >
>> >      Mike
>> >
>> >      >
>> >      > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas"
>> <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com at nanog.org on behalf of
>> mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>> >      >
>> >      >
>> >      >      On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
>> >      >      > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist
>> voice
>> >      >      > providers for flouting robocall rules
>> >      >      >
>> >      >      >
>> https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
>> >      >      >
>> >      >      > [...]
>> >      >      > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its
>> obligations under
>> >      >      > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone
>> networks. Fines
>> >      >      > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel
>> said in a
>> >      >      > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that
>> don’t follow
>> >      >      > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now
>> face swift
>> >      >      > consequences.”
>> >      >      >
>> >      >      > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to
>> reduce the
>> >      >      > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification
>> protocols
>> >      >      > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this summer.
>> >      >      > [...]
>> >      >
>> >      >      Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
>> >      >
>> >      >      Mike
>> >      >
>> >
>> >
>>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/attachments/20221004/3f2f9e6b/attachment.html>


More information about the NANOG mailing list