Operator survey: Incrementally deployable secure Internet routing

Tom Beecher beecher at beecher.cc
Mon Jan 24 21:12:28 UTC 2022

This seems like Rube Goldberg Machine levels of complexity and overhead to
try and solve for forged-origin , when good best practices already makes
the risk of that almost negligible.

On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 5:22 PM Yixin Sun <yixins at alumni.princeton.edu>

> Dear Nanog,
> We appreciate that your time is very precious, but we wanted to ask you
> for your help in answering a brief survey about a new secure routing system
> we have developed in a research collaboration between ETH, Princeton
> University, and University of Virginia. We'd like to thank those of you who
> have already helped us fill out the survey and provided insightful
> feedback. Your input is critical for helping inform our further work on
> this project.
> Here is the link to our survey, which takes about 10 minutes to complete,
> including watching a brief 3-minute introductory video:
> https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc4VCkqd7i88y0CbJ31B7tVXyxBlhEy_zsYZByx6tsKAE7ROg/viewform?usp=pp_url&entry.549791324=NANOG+mailing+list
> Our architecture, called Secure Backbone AS (SBAS), allows clients to
> benefit from emerging secure routing deployments like SCION by tunneling
> into a secure infrastructure. SBAS provides substantial routing security
> improvements when retrofitted to the current Internet. It also provides
> benefits even to non-participating networks and endpoints when
> communicating with an SBAS-protected entity.
> We currently have a functional prototype of this network using SCIONLab
> (for the secure backbone) and the PEERING testbed (to make outbound BGP
> announcements). Our ultimate aim is to develop and deploy SBAS beyond an
> experimental scope, and the input of network operators that would actually
> have to run these PoPs would greatly benefit this project and help make
> secure routing a reality.
> With kind regards,
> Prateek, Adrian, and Yixin
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