Yet another BGP hijacking towards AS16509

Job Snijders job at
Tue Aug 23 08:47:47 UTC 2022

Dear Siyuan, others,

Thank you for the elaborate write-up and the log snippets. You
contributed a comprehensive overview of what transpired from a
publicly-visible perspective, what steps led up to the strike.

I want to jump in on one small point which I often see as a point of
confusion in our industry:

On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 01:54:50AM +0200, Siyuan Miao wrote:
> Nowadays hijacking a service by forging AS path is pretty easy and
> RPKI won't be able to solve this (as it validates origin AS and
> prefixes only) :-(

I do think RPKI can help solve this! The "RPKI" is a cryptographically
secured distributed database of authorizations for Internet Resource
Numbers (IP addresses & AS numbers). (((yikes, that's a mouthful :-)))

Another way of looking at the RPKI is as a "general purpose framework",
a framework on top of which the Internet community can build multiple
"applications". These applications include:

A) Route Origin Validation (aka "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811)
B) BGPSec (AS Path validation, RFC 8205)
C) ASPA (draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-{profile,verification}, combating
         routeleaks by publishing what ASNs are your upstreams)
D) .. and others:

Nowadays Item A ("BGP Origin Validation") is widely deployed: all major
IP Transit carriers & major IX Route Server operators use RPKI ROAs to
filter out BGP announcements which have the wrong BGP Origin AS in the
AS_PATH. This is fantastic (and relatively recent) news!

Item B ("BGPsec") and C ("ASPA") are "work in progress": people are
building software, running experiments, studying what it would take to
get those technologies deployed in the wild (the 'production Internet'). 

BGPSec and ASPA are complementary solutions, each has its challenges and
opportunities. BGPsec prevents path spoofing, while ASPA can prevent
route leaks. These are similar but not identical threats that are often
conflated. ASPA and BGPsec should not be thought of as mutually
exclusive or incompatible; both of these technologies will support
routing security in the long term.

I recently co-authored an elaboration to the FCC on where the industry
stands and how some technologies relate to each other, this might be of
interest to some folks:

Kind regards,


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