Malicious SS7 activity and why SMS should never by used for 2FA

Mon Apr 19 15:10:04 UTC 2021

>
> Can you point out the specific data you think supports your claim?
>

I can, but I'm not going to, because that's not what this side discussion
has been based on.

You said :

These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
> fishers, or data ransomers.

I just showed you data that shows they are, but now are trying to move the
goalposts with new quantifiers. I think this discussion has run its course
for me. Take care.

On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 10:45 AM Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:

> I don’t see any data showing that poor people are *targets* of Account
> access attacks. Can you point out the specific data you think supports your
> claim?
>
> -mel via cell
>
> On Apr 19, 2021, at 7:33 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>
> 
>
> https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2020/csn_annual_data_book_2020.pdf
>
> https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit18.pdf
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 10:10 AM Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:
>
>> Can you cite data? Or provide a rational argument other than “they are”?
>>
>> -mel via cell
>>
>> On Apr 19, 2021, at 7:01 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>
>> 
>>
>>> These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
>>> fishers, or data ransomers.
>>>
>>
>> This is patently false. Low-income / disabled / minority / non-english
>> speakers are absolutely targets of scams like those, and in
>> significant numbers.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 9:33 AM Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Tom,
>>>
>>> Well, yes, not everyone can afford all technology options. That’s life.
>>> One has to wonder how someone who needs to protect online accounts cannot
>>> afford a $30 hardware token (which can be shared across several accounts).
>>> These low-income people are not the targets of identity thieves, spear
>>> fishers, or data ransomers. Unlike you, I AM arguing against something: SMS
>>> as a 2FA token. In this case I don’t think we have ignored low-income
>>> users, for the same reason that home alarm security aren't ignoring
>>> low-income users who can’t afford their products. It’s certainly no reason
>>> to hobble security for the rest of us.
>>>
>>>  -mel
>>>
>>>
>>> On Apr 19, 2021, at 6:07 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>>
>>> HW tokens are great, sure.
>>>
>>> Except there is a lot of overlap in the Venn diagram between those who
>>> still use feature phones and those that spending $30 on said hardware token
>>> is financially obtrusive. ( Not to mention that every hardware token I can
>>> remember looking at requires an app to set themselves up in the first
>>> place, and if this is for the people who can't install apps, that's an
>>> interesting circular dependency. )
>>>
>>> I'm not arguing for or against anything here honestly. I'm just pointing
>>> out that we ( as in the technical community we ) have a tendency to put
>>> forward solutions that completely ignore what might be reasonably feasible
>>> for those of lower income , or parts of the world not as technologically
>>> developed as we might be in ourselves, and we should try to shrink that gap
>>> whenever possible, not make it worse.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 8:47 AM Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Then they can buy a hardware token. Using SMS is provably insecure, and
>>>> for people being spear-phished (a much more common occurrence now that so
>>>> much net worth data has been breached), a huge risk
>>>>
>>>>  -mel
>>>>
>>>> On Apr 19, 2021, at 5:44 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> 
>>>>
>>>>> As far as I know, authenticators on cell phone apps don’t require the
>>>>> Internet. For example, the Google Authenticator mobile app doesn't require
>>>>> any Internet or cellular connection
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Lots of people still use feature phones that are not capable of running
>>>> applications such as this.
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Apr 18, 2021 at 9:05 AM Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> As far as I know, authenticators on cell phone apps don’t require the
>>>>> Internet. For example, the Google Authenticator mobile app doesn't require
>>>>> any Internet or cellular connection. The authenticated system generates a
>>>>> secret key - a unique 16 or 32 character alphanumeric code. This key is
>>>>> scanned by GA or can be entered manually and as a result, both the
>>>>> authenticated system and GA know the same secret key, and can compute the
>>>>> time-based 2nd factor OTP just as hardware tokens do.
>>>>>
>>>>> There are two algorithms: HOTP and TOTP. The main difference is in OTP
>>>>> expiration time: with HOTP, the OTP is valid until it hasn’t been used;
>>>>> TOTP times out after some specified interval - usually 30 or 60 seconds.
>>>>> For TOTP, the system time must be synced, otherwise the generated OTPs will
>>>>> be wrong. But you can get accurate enough clock time without the Internet,
>>>>> either manually using some radio source such as WWV, or by GPS or cellular
>>>>> system synchronization.
>>>>>
>>>>>  -mel
>>>>>
>>>>> > On Apr 18, 2021, at 5:46 AM, Mark Tinka <mark at tinka.africa> wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> > 
>>>>> >
>>>>> >> On 4/18/21 05:18, Mel Beckman wrote:
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> No, every SMS 2FA should be prohibited by regulatory
>>>>> certifications. The telcos had years to secure SMS. They did nothing. The
>>>>> plethora of well-secured commercial 2FA authentication tokens, many of them
>>>>> free, should be a mandatory replacement for 2FA in every security
>>>>> governance regime, such as PCI, financial account access, government web
>>>>> portals, etc.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > While I agree that SMS is insecure at the moment, I think there
>>>>> still needs to be a mechanism that does not rely on the presence of an
>>>>> Internet connection. One may not be able to have access to the Internet for
>>>>> a number of reasons (traveling, coverage, outage, device, money, e.t.c.),
>>>>> and a fallback needs to be available to authenticate.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > I know some companies have been pushing for voice authentication for
>>>>> their services through a phone call, in lieu of SMS or DTMF-based PIN's.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > We need something that works at the lowest common denominator as
>>>>> well, because as available as the Internet is worldwide, it's not yet at a
>>>>> level that one would consider "basic access".
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Mark.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/attachments/20210419/151bf8a9/attachment.html>