NTT/AS2914 enabled RPKI OV 'invalid = reject' EBGP policies

Job Snijders job at
Thu Mar 26 00:50:39 UTC 2020

Dear group,

Exciting news! Today NTT's Global IP Network (AS 2914) enabled RPKI
based BGP Origin Validation on virtually all EBGP sessions, both
customer and peering edge. This change positively impacts the Internet
routing system.

The use of RPKI technology is a critical component in our efforts to
improve Internet routing stability and reduce the negative impact of
misconfigurations or malicious attacks. RPKI Invalid route announcements
are now rejected in NTT EBGP ingress policies. A nice side effect:
peerlock AS_PATH filters are incredibly effective when combined with

For NTT, this is the result of a multiyear project, which included
outreach, education, collaboration with industry partners, and
production of open source software shared among colleagues in the

Shout out to Louis & team (Cloudflare) for the open source GoRTR
software and the OpenBSD project for rpki-client(8).

I hope some take this news as encouragement to consider RPKI OV
"invalid == reject"-policies as safe to deploy in their own BGP
environments too. :-)

If you have questions, feel free to reach out to me directly or the
NTT NOC at <noc at>.

Kind regards,


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