BGP route hijack by AS10990

Fri Jul 31 08:55:45 UTC 2020

On 31.07.2020 10.47, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> Hank Nussbacher wrote on 31/07/2020 08:21:
>> But wait - MANRS indicates that Telia does everything right:
>
> Not only that, Telia indicates that Telia does everything right:
>
>> https://www.teliacarrier.com/our-network/bgp-routing/routing-security-.html 
>>
>
> "We reject RPKI Invalids on all BGP Sessions; for both Peers and 
> Customers."

If true that none of the affected prefixes where signed, this is a good 
case to get some people to sign their prefixes. Everyone affected will 
have to accepted shared blame, because they could have prevented the 
issue by following best practice by doing their RPKI signing.

Regards,

Baldur