RPKI for dummies

Fabien VINCENT (NaNOG) list-nanog at beufa.net
Thu Aug 20 13:51:20 UTC 2020


Hi,

In fact, RPKI does nothing about AS Path checks if it's your question. 
RPKI is based on ROA where signatures are published to guarantee you're 
the owner of a specific prefix with optionnal different maxLength from 
your ASN.

So if the question is about if RPKI is sufficient to secure the whole 
BGP path, well, it's not. RPKI guarantee / permit only to verify the 
ressource announcements (IPvX block) is really owned by your ASN. But 
even if it's not sufficient, we need to deploy it to start securing 
resources', not the whole path.

Don't know if it replies to your question, but you can read also the 
pretty good documentation on RPKI here : 
https://rpki.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rpki/introduction.html or the 
corresponding RFC ;)

Le 20-08-2020 15:20, Dovid Bender a écrit :

> Hi,
> 
> I am sorry for the n00b question. Can someone help point me in the 
> right direction to understand how RPKI works? I understand that from my 
> side that I create a key, submit the public portion to ARIN and then 
> send a signed request to ARIN asking them to publish it. How do ISP's 
> that receive my advertisement (either directly from me, meaning my 
> upstreams or my upstreams upstream) verify against the cert that the 
> advertisement is coming from me? If say we have
> Medium ISP (AS1000) -> Large ISP (AS200)
> in the above case AS200 know it's peering with AS1000 so it will take 
> all advertisements. What's stopping AS1000 from adding a router to 
> their network to impersonate me,  make it look like I am peering with 
> them and then they re-advertise the path to Large ISP?
> 
> Again sorry for the n00b question, I am trying to make sense of how it 
> works.
> 
> TIA.
> 
> Dovid

-- 
Fabien VINCENT
_ at beufanet_
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