Phishing and telemarketing telephone calls

Tue Apr 28 03:00:52 UTC 2020

STIR/SHAKEN?

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020, 14:34 Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:

>
> On 4/27/20 11:12 AM, Jon Lewis wrote:
> > On Mon, 27 Apr 2020, William Herrin wrote:
> >
> >> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 7:32 PM Matthew Black
> >> <Matthew.Black at csulb.edu> wrote:
> >>> Good grief, selling a kit for $47. Since all robocalls employ Caller
> >>> ID spoofing, just how does one prove who called?
> >>
> >> You don't. AFAICT, that's the point of Anne's comments. Finding them
> >> is good enough. Paying off anyone who both finds them and appears well
> >> connected with the law is cheaper than allowing the legal system to
> >> become aware of their identities and activity.
> >>
> >> Blackmail 101 dude. Find someone with a secret and demand payment for
> >> your silence. The best part is that if you're legitimately entitled to
> >> the money because of the secret then it's not technically blackmail.
> >>
> >> Presumably the meat of the $47 kit is about how to tease out enough
> >> clues to search public records and identify them.
> >
> > In my experience, the caller-id is always forged, and the call center
> > reps hang up or give uselessly vague answers if I ask what company
> > they're calling from.  I suspect the only sure way to identify them is
> > to do business with them, i.e. buy that extended warranty on your car,
> > or at least start walking through the process until either payment is
> > made or they tell you who you'll have to pay.  I wonder, if you agree
> > to buy the extended warranty, solely for the purpose of identifying
> > them, can you immediately cancel it / dispute the charge?
> >
> > Then there are the 100% criminal ones calling from "Windows Technical
> > Support" who want to trick you into giving them remote admin access to
> > your PC.  I assume that's a dry well and the best you can hope to do
> > is waste as much of their time as yours and see how foul a mouth they
> > have.
> >
> On the IETF list, I've been making the case that a DKIM-like solution
> for SIP signalling would in fact give you the way to blame somebody,
> which was DKIM's entire raison d'etre. Who cares what the actual fake
> e.164 address is and whether the sending domain is allowed to assert it
> or not? That is rather beside the point. All I care is that the
> originating domain is supporting abuse, and I know what the domain is to
> complain to, ignore, etc.
>
> Mike
>
>
>
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