"Is BGP safe yet?" test

Tue Apr 21 16:15:30 UTC 2020

Not sure how this helps? If RIPE (or a government official/court) decides the sanctions against Iranian LIRs prevents them from issuing number resources to said LIRs, they would just remove the delegation. They’d probably then issue an AS0 ROA to replace out given the “AS0 ROA for bogons” policy. In an hour or so these LIRs are now disconnected from the world.

> On Apr 21, 2020, at 02:30, Alex Band <alex at nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 21 Apr 2020, at 11:09, Baldur Norddahl <baldur.norddahl at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On 21.04.2020 10.56, Sander Steffann wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>> 
>>>> Removing a resource from the certificate to achieve the goal you describe will make the route announcement NotFound, which means it will be accepted. Evil RIR would have to replace an existing ROA with one that explicitly makes a route invalid, i.e. issue an AS0 ROA for specific member prefix. This seems like a pretty convoluted way to try and take a network offline.
>>> I've seen worse…
>>> Sander
>>> 
>> 
>> As long Good RIR continues to publish a valid ROA for the real ASN that evil AS0 ROA would have no effect?
> 
> Correct.
> 
> Should this really be a concern, then you can run Delegated RPKI. In that case the RIR can’t tamper with your ROA because it’s not on their systems. Evil RIR could only revoke a prefix from your certificate or your entire certificate, but again, your BGP announcements would fall back to NotFound and would be accepted.
> 
> -Alex