BGP prefix filter list / BGP hijacks, different type

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at
Fri May 17 14:27:37 UTC 2019

Did this get resolved? if not please email me directly.

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 9:46 AM Denys Fedoryshchenko
<nuclearcat at> wrote:
> I wanted to mention one additional important point in all these
> monitoring discussion.
> Right now, for one of my subnets Google services stopped working.
> Why? Because it seems like someone from Russia did BGP hijack, BUT,
> exclusively for google services (most likely some kind of peering).
> Quite by chance, I noticed that the traceroute from the google cloud to
> this subnet goes through Russia, although my country has nothing to do
> with Russia at all, not even transit traffic through them.
> Sure i mailed noc at google, but reaching someone in big companies is not
> easiest job, you need to search for some contact that answers. And good
> luck for realtime communications.
> And, all large CDNs have their own "internet", although they have BGP,
> they often interpret it in their own way, which no one but them can
> monitor and keep history. No looking glass for sure, as well.
> If your network is announced by a malicious party from another country,
> you will not even know about it, but your requests(actually answers from
> service) will go through this party.

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