eyeronic.design at gmail.com
Thu Jan 24 17:03:56 UTC 2019
Or you could simply fix your gear rather than leaving a big hole in your
On Thu, Jan 24, 2019, 7:25 AM Ben Cooper <ben at packet.gg wrote:
> Can you stop this?
> You caused again a massive prefix spike/flap, and as the internet is not
> centered around NA (shock horror!) a number of operators in Asia and
> Australia go effected by your “expirment” and had no idea what was
> happening or why.
> Get a sandbox like every other researcher, as of now we have black holed
> and filtered your whole ASN, and have reccomended others do the same.
> On Wed, 23 Jan 2019 at 1:19 am, Italo Cunha <cunha at dcc.ufmg.br> wrote:
>> This is a reminder that this experiment will resume tomorrow
>> (Wednesday, Jan. 23rd). We will announce 22.214.171.124/24 carrying a
>> BGP attribute of type 0xff (reserved for development) between 14:00
>> and 14:15 GMT.
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:05 AM Italo Cunha <cunha at dcc.ufmg.br> wrote:
>> > NANOG,
>> > We would like to inform you of an experiment to evaluate alternatives
>> > for speeding up adoption of BGP route origin validation (research
>> > paper with details [A]).
>> > Our plan is to announce prefix 126.96.36.199/24 with a valid
>> > standards-compliant unassigned BGP attribute from routers operated by
>> > the PEERING testbed [B, C]. The attribute will have flags 0xe0
>> > (optional transitive [rfc4271, S4.3]), type 0xff (reserved for
>> > development), and size 0x20 (256bits).
>> > Our collaborators recently ran an equivalent experiment with no
>> > complaints or known issues [A], and so we do not anticipate any
>> > arising. Back in 2010, an experiment using unassigned attributes by
>> > RIPE and Duke University caused disruption in Internet routing due to
>> > a bug in Cisco routers [D, CVE-2010-3035]. Since then, this and other
>> > similar bugs have been patched [e.g., CVE-2013-6051], and new BGP
>> > attributes have been assigned (BGPsec-path) and adopted (large
>> > communities). We have successfully tested propagation of the
>> > announcements on Cisco IOS-based routers running versions 12.2(33)SRA
>> > and 15.3(1)S, Quagga 0.99.23.1 and 1.1.1, as well as BIRD 1.4.5 and
>> > 1.6.3.
>> > We plan to announce 188.8.131.52/24 from 8 PEERING locations for a
>> > predefined period of 15 minutes starting 14:30 GMT, from Monday to
>> > Thursday, between the 7th and 22nd of January, 2019 (full schedule and
>> > locations [E]). We will stop the experiment immediately in case any
>> > issues arise.
>> > Although we do not expect the experiment to cause disruption, we
>> > welcome feedback on its safety and especially on how to make it safer.
>> > We can be reached at disco-experiment at googlegroups.com.
>> > Amir Herzberg, University of Connecticut
>> > Ethan Katz-Bassett, Columbia University
>> > Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT
>> > Ítalo Cunha, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
>> > Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
>> > Tomas Hlavacek, Fraunhofer SIT
>> > Yossi Gilad, MIT
>> > [A] https://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2018/program.html
>> > [B] http://peering.usc.edu
>> > [C] https://goo.gl/AFR1Cn
>> > [D]
>> > [E] https://goo.gl/nJhmx1
> Ben Cooper
> Chief Executive Officer
> PacketGG - Multicast
> M(Telstra): 0410 411 301
> M(Optus): 0434 336 743
> E: ben at packet.gg & ben at multicast.net.au
> W: https://packet.gg
> W: https://multicast.net.au
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