ASNs decimation in ZW this morning

Colin Johnston colinj at gt86car.org.uk
Thu Jan 17 09:29:19 UTC 2019



> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:07, Mark Tinka <mark.tinka at seacom.mu> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 16/Jan/19 19:49, John Von Essen wrote:
> 
>> Im confused as to what exactly happened and how it was implemented. I
>> assume the government wanted to restrict access to sites like
>> whatsapp, facebook, twitter, etc.,. So did they tell national
>> ISPs/Mobile (strong-arm) to simply block access to those sites, or
>> they did they tell them to completely shutdown and go dark until the
>> protests were over. Im just curious as to how an ISP/Mobile would
>> selectively block access under government influence, reason being...
>> understanding how can help us think of ways to get around it.
>> 
>> For example, lets say the mobile networks null routed all traffic
>> destined to twitter and facebook networks... not a complete IP
>> shutdown. So a local citizen is using email from a local provider
>> (non-gmail, etc.,.) and still has access to email, Twitter knows they
>> are blocked in ZW, but they still try to email updates to this example
>> citizen. If their networks are being null routed, they can simply
>> deliver the email via an alternate network/platform.
>> 
>> The whole thing is very disturbing, I mean this is 2019 right? Not
>> 1984...
> 
> It's not unusual for networks to be shutdown, particularly during riots
> and/or elections. I'm not saying it's right or wrong, I'm just saying
> it's not unusual.
> 
> This happened during the recent elections in Uganda and Kenya, for example.
> 
> Typically, the operating licenses issued by the gubbermints to operators
> provide for legal avenues by the gubbermint to shutdown services. It is
> not the gubbermint's responsibility as to how this is implemented by the
> operators, just that it be done.
> 
Would a service be viewed as the same as (layer2 connectivity to a out of country layer3/layer4 endpoint).
ie ip source out of country but connectivity layer in country ?
satcomms in effect but terrestrial based pvc with leaf router out of country.

Colin


> In recent years, social media resources have been targets, so Facebook,
> WhatsApp, Twitter et al. However, if the gubbermint takes a broader
> approach, it's up to the operator to figure out how to do it. Failure to
> comply can result in arrests, fines, jail or even revocation of the license.
> 
> All mobile operators have terribly advanced DPI infrastructure, so it's
> not difficult to shut services down at a very granular level.
> 
> Operators that deliver services via terrestrial means also employ DPI
> infrastructure, because selling bandwidth access by the Gig-loads is big
> business :-\. So they, too, can implement shutdowns with a reasonable
> degree of granularity.
> 
> Mark.
> 




More information about the NANOG mailing list