A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking

Jacques Latour Jacques.Latour at cira.ca
Tue Feb 26 17:15:54 UTC 2019

DNSSEC should of never been part of the domain registration process, it was because we didn’t have the CDS/CDNSKEY channel to automated the DS maintenance and bootstrap. But if you keep DNSSEC maintenance outside the registrar control then it can be effective tool (amongst other) in identifying hijacks.  Taking away he ability of the bad actors to disable DNSSEC via registrar control panel.

This is what happens when you have all your eggs in one basket and you loose the keys to your kingdom.

From: NANOG <nanog-bounces at nanog.org> On Behalf Of Bill Woodcock
Sent: February 26, 2019 4:57 AM
To: Hank Nussbacher <hank at efes.iucc.ac.il>
Cc: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: Re: A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking

> On Feb 24, 2019, at 10:03 PM, Hank Nussbacher <hank at efes.iucc.ac.il<mailto:hank at efes.iucc.ac.il>> wrote:
> Did you have a CAA record defined and if not, why not?

It’s something we’d been planning to do but, ironically, we’d been in the process of switching to Let’s Encrypt, and they were one of the two CAs whose process vulnerabilities the attackers were exploiting.  So, in this particular case, it wouldn’t have helped.

I guess the combination of CAA with a very expensive, or very manual, CA, might be an improvement.  But it’s still a band-aid on a bankrupt system.

We need to get switched over to DANE as quickly as possible, and stop wasting effort trying to keep the CA system alive with ever-hackier band-aids.


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