A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking

Tue Feb 26 16:29:35 UTC 2019

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On Mon, 2019-02-25 at 17:04 +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> I would also note that a organisation can deploy RFC 5011 for their
> own zones and have their own equipment use DNSKEYs managed using RFC
> 5011 for their own zones.  This isolates the organisation's equipment
> from the parent zone's management practices.

I want a registrar that can use TOTP 2fa for updates, but that
interferes with automated KSK key rollovers. Are there any registrars
that use rfc5011 to allow automated KSK key rollovers, combined with
TOTP 2fa for web based updates like the initial transition to a secure
zone, NS record changes, etc.?

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