[EXTERNAL] Re: RTBH no_export
Nikos.Leontsinis at eu.equinix.com
Mon Feb 4 08:39:19 UTC 2019
This is a 20+ year old solution. Ugly because you will block good traffic and on your effort to protect your network you will block legitimate traffic too (satisfying the attacker) but most upstream providers
will give you a community to use (Cogent is a notable exception) and tag the prefix under attack so that the attack will not reach your network.
Sadly most IXs after 20 years they still don't understand the need for this community but at least someone has written an rfc so that all of us use the same community.
At least we made some progress there...
From: NANOG <nanog-bounces at nanog.org> On Behalf Of Paul S.
Sent: Sunday, February 3, 2019 11:08 PM
To: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: RTBH no_export
+1, exactly what we did. I also recommend implementing
per-upstream/region blackhole communities (so your users can choose who to blackhole as they see fit.)
Often time, DDoS traffic comes from regions that do not intersect with legitimate traffic.
On 2/4/2019 03:15 午前, Tom Hill wrote:
> On 31/01/2019 20:17, Nick Hilliard wrote:
>> you should implement a different community for upstream blackholing.
>> This should be stripped at your upstream links and replaced with the
>> provider's RTBH community. Your provider will then handle export
>> restrictions as they see fit.
> This works wonderfully, from past experience. :)
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