Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation (fwd)

Jon Lewis jlewis at lewis.org
Fri Apr 26 21:36:01 UTC 2019


On Fri, 26 Apr 2019, William Herrin wrote:

> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 9:41 AM Matt Harris <matt at netfire.net> wrote:
>       Can you (or someone else on the list, perhaps even someone who was involved in voting this down) provide some more details as to why it was rejected?
> 
> 
> Hi Matt,
> 
> As I understand it (someone with better knowledge feel free to correct me) the proposal was ruled out of scope for ARIN because ARIN registers numbers, it doesn't
> decide how they're allowed to be routed. ISPs do that. 
> 
> I personally support the petition. I think the out of scope reasoning is flawed. By enforcing minimum assignment sizes, ARIN has long acted as a gatekeeper to the
> routing system, controlling who can and can not participate. For better or worse, that puts the proposal in scope.
> 
> I personally think it's for worse. I oppose the proposal itself. I'd just as soon ARIN not act as a gatekeeper to BGP and certain don't want to see it expand that
> role. 

Maybe I missed it in the proposal, but I don't see that it actually says 
what ARIN will do other than produce a report "Yep, our expert panel says 
this is hijacked.".  What's the expected result (other than the report)? 
i.e. What action is ARIN expected to take after it's determined a route 
advertisement is a hijacking that will make a difference?

Anecdotally, ARIN has, in the past, gotten involved in this sort of thing. 
Many years ago, during an acquisition that went sour at the last minute, 
the renegging seller went to ARIN complaining that we were hijacking his 
IP space.  ARIN contacted our upstreams and pressured them to pressure us 
to stop advertising the IP space.  Perhaps there's no official policy, and 
perhaps they wouldn't do this today without one?

----------------------------------------------------------------------
  Jon Lewis, MCP :)           |  I route
                              |  therefore you are
_________ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_________


More information about the NANOG mailing list