ARIN RPKI TAL deployment issues

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at gmail.com
Wed Sep 26 06:09:39 UTC 2018


(I'm going to regret posting this later, but...)

On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 10:57 PM John Curran <jcurran at arin.net> wrote:

>
> The significant difference for ARIN is that we operate under a different
> legal regime, and as a matter of US law, it appears that we cannot rely
> only upon terms and conditions published in our website as evidence of
> informed agreement; i.e. within the US legal framework, we need a specific
> act of acceptance in order to have a binding agreement.
>

how is arin's problem here different from that which 'lets encrypt' is
facing with their Cert things?
Don't they have the same sort of problem as ARIN? "somoene trusted a cert
signed by LE for "thing" and got scammed/harmed/etc"

It seems odd, to me anyway, that this is seemingly so very different...
I also would like less friction in the RPKI process...I don't think it
serves ARIN, it's community nor the global internet community to make
things harder to secure/validate.
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