Reaching out to ARIN members about their RPKI INVALID prefixes
job at ntt.net
Wed Sep 19 07:44:57 UTC 2018
On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 06:18:00PM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:
> That depends. If you ONLY allow the maintainer of NET-126.96.36.199/24
> to update the route objects for it, then the word ONLY is effectively
> present by the lack of any other route objects.
Ah, so you are now applying the RPKI Origin Validation procedure to a
non-existent flavor of IRR? :-)
Today I can create route-objects covering 188.8.131.52/24 in a number of
IRR databases and there is nothing you can do to prevent that, this
simply is not the case with RPKI. I prefer an existing system (RPKI)
over hypotheticals (Owen's IRR).
Secondly, I've also noticed you only emphasize an adversarial angle
(origin spoofing), but there are other angles too.
The majority of today's BGP problems are attributable to operator
mistakes (misconfigurations). Analysis has shown that most BGP incidents
happen on weekdays rather than in the weekend. The number keys on our
keyboards are quite close to each other and Origin Validation is very
effective against typos. Another angle is bugs in BGP implementations:
your neighbors doing origin validation reduces the impact and
propagation of incorrect announcements from your network should you run
into a software defect.
> So RPKI is great if we can just reduce the internet diameter to 1
Agreed, in other words: RPKI is offers tangible benefits to those that
peer directly with each other, or use peerlock.
> in which case MD5 passwords on your BGP sessions pretty much
> accomplishes the same thing with a lot less kerfuffle.
Uhh... you may want to refresh your memory on what BGP is and how
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