Re: China ’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’ s BGP Hijacking

Wed Nov 7 09:18:26 UTC 2018

On 05/11/2018 10:54, Tore Anderson wrote:
> * Harley H
>
>> Curious to hear others' thoughts on this. 
>> https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=mca
>>
>> This paper presents the view that several BGP hijacks performed by China Telecom had malicious intent. The incidents are:
>> * Canada to Korea - 2016
>> * US to Italy - Oct 2016
>> * Scandinavia to Japan - April-May 2017
>> * Italy to Thailand - April-July 2017
>>
>> The authors claim this is enabled by China Telecom's presence in North America.
> Hi,
>
> I looked a bit into the Scandinavia to Japan claim last week for a Norwegian
> journalist, who obviously found this rather sensational claim very intriguing.
> The article (Norwegian, but Google Translate does a decent job) is found at 
> https://www.digi.no/artikler/internettrafikk-fra-norge-og-sverige-ble-kapret-og-omdirigert-til-kina/449797?key=vS1EOiG1
> in case you're interested.
>
> >From what I can tell from looking at routeviews data from the period, what
> happened was that SK Broadband (AS9318) was leaking a bunch of routes to
> China Telecom (AS4134). The leak included the transit routes from SKB's
> upstream Verizon (AS703) and customers of theirs in turn, including well-
> known organisations such as Bloomberg (AS10361) and Time Warner (AS36032),
> which I suppose might be the ones the paper is referring to.
>
> The routes in question then propagated from CT to Telia Carrier (AS1299),
> probably in North America somewhere. Scandinavia is TC's home turf, it
> makes sense that the detour via CT was easily observed from here.
>
> If you want to see for yourself, look for «1299 4134 9318 703» in
> http://archive.routeviews.org/route-views.linx/bgpdata/2017.04/RIBS/rib.20170430.2200.bz2
>
> Anyway, in my opinion the data for this particular incident (I haven't
> looked into the other three) does not indicate foul play on CT's behalf,
> but rather a pretty standard leak by SKB followed by sloppy filtering
> by CT and TC both.
>
> Tore
>
https://www.zdnet.com/article/oracle-confirms-china-telecom-internet-traffic-misdirections/

"But today, Doug Madory, Director of Oracle's Internet Analysis division
(formerly Dyn), confirmed that China Telecom has, indeed, engaged in
internet traffic "misdirection."

"I don't intend to address the paper's claims around the motivations of
these actions," said
<https://internetintel.oracle.com/blog-single.html?id=China+Telecom%27s+Internet+Traffic+Misdirection>
Madori. "However, there is truth to the assertion that China Telecom
(whether intentionally or not) has misdirected internet traffic
(including out of the United States) in recent years."

"I know because I expended a great deal of effort to stop it in 2017,"
Madori said.

He then goes on to detail several of China Telecom's BGP route
"misdirections," most of which have involved hijacking US-to-US traffic
and sending it via mainland China before returning it to the US."

-Hank

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