New Active Exploit: memcached on port 11211 UDP & TCP being exploited for reflection attacks

Bjørn Mork bjorn at
Fri Mar 2 11:49:13 UTC 2018

Owen DeLong <owen at> writes:

> I don’t agree that making RFC-1918 limitations a default in any daemon makes any
> sense whatsoever.


One of the more annoying anti-features I know of in this regard is the
dnsmasq rebind "protection".  It claims to protect web browsers on the
LAN against DNS rebind attacks.  But the implementation does not
consider which adresses are used on the LAN at all.  It simply blocks
any A record pointing to an RFC1918 address, making a few bogus
- IPv4 LAN addresses are selected from RFC1918
- RFC1918 addresses are never used on the WAN side of a CPE
- Noone use IPv6 on their LAN

It's hard to know how many users have been bitten by the first
one. You'd have to depend on this rebind "protection" in the first
place, and that would be.... stupid.

But the second assumption regularily bites end users when their ISP
provides some ISP internal service using RFC1918 addresses.  Which of course
is fine.

The anti-feature has been enabled by default in OpenWrt for a long time,
ref , which means that
there is a large user base having this enabled without knowing.

> First, there are plenty of LANs out there that don’t use RFC-1918.
> Second, RFC-1918 doesn’t apply to IPv6 at all,

Could you try to explain that to the OpenWrt guys?  Thanks


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