automatic rtbh trigger using flow data

Fri Aug 31 00:14:50 UTC 2018

> Aaron Gould wrote :
> I'm really surprised that you all are doing this based on source ip, simply because I thought the distribution of botnet members around
> the world we're so extensive that I never really thought it possible to filter based on sources, if so I'd like to see the list too.

I emailed you. For years I ran it at home on a Cisco 1841, 100,000 BGP prefixes is nothing these days. I am not surprised that Joe pushes that to some CPEs.

> Even so, this would not stop the attacks from hitting my front door, my side of my Internet uplink...when paying for a 30 gigs CIR
> and paying double for megabits per second over that, up to the ceiling of 100 gig every bit that hits my front door over 30 gig
> would cost me extra, remotely triggering based on my victim IP address inside my network would be my solution to saving money.

I agree. If you want to get a real use of source blacklisting, to save bandwidth, you probably went to rent a U in a rack at your upstream(s) to block it there.
I never did it past 1GE, and I have never measured seriously the bandwidth it would save, would be curious to know.
I think the two approaches are complementary to each other though.

Michel.

On Aug 30, 2018, at 6:43 PM, Michel Py <michel.py at tsisemi.com> wrote:

>> Joe Maimon wrote :
>> I use a bunch of scripts plus a supervisory sqlite3 database process all injecting into quagga
> 
> I have the sqlite part planned, today I'm using a flat file :-( I know :-(
> 
>> Also aimed at attacker sources. I feed it with honeypots and live servers, hooked into fail2ban and using independent host scripts. Not very sophisticated, the remotes use ssh executed commands to add/delete. I also setup a promiscuous ebgp RR so I can extend my umbrella to CPE with diverse connectivity.
> 
> I would like to have your feed. How many attacker prefixes do you currently have ?
> 
>> Using flow data, that sounds like an interesting direction to take this into, so thank you!
> 
> The one thing we can share here is the attacker prefixes. The victim prefixes are unique to each of us but I expect our attacker prefixes to be very close.
> 
> Michel.
> 
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