tcp md5 bgp attacks?

lobna gouda lobna_gouda at
Wed Aug 15 23:06:11 UTC 2018

Out of curiosity, are you asking for a specific  research/project that you need some data for?

GTSM is not a replacement for the ACL filtering the bgp speakers or the MD5 ( that is widely supported).

 If GTSM is not supported you can always predefine the TTL  it in the session and manipulate the defaults ( 1 for EBGP 64 IBGP) yet this is works on small scale networks.

Another practice is to define who starts the session ( as port 179 is not hard to figure). Yet in all case the ACL is your first defense who is allowed for TCP and when the session is established what they can advertise and what you are willing to accept across the session ( NXT hop, n0. of routers, as-path, communities....etc).


BGP Security – the MD5 password and GTSM | Noction<>
There are three security mechanisms that can protect against potential security issues with BGP: the BGP TCP MD5 password, IPsec and GTSM...



From: NANOG <nanog-bounces at> on behalf of Randy Bush <randy at>
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2018 5:38 PM
To: North American Network Operators' Group
Subject: tcp md5 bgp attacks?

so we started to wonder if, since we started protecting our bgp
sessions with md5 (in the 1990s), are there still folk trying to

we were unable to find bgp mib counters.  there are igp interface
counters, but that was not our immediate interest.  we did find
that md5 failures are logged.

looking at my logs for a few years, i find essentially nothing;
two 'attackers,' one my own ibgp peer, and one that noted evildoer
rob thomas,

we would be interested in data from others.

note that we are neither contemplating nor suggesting removing md5
from [y]our bgp sessions.


[]<>    Virus-free.<>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <>

More information about the NANOG mailing list