AS29073, 126.96.36.199/14, Level3: Why does anyone peer with these schmucks?
Dave.Siegel at level3.com
Mon Aug 14 20:17:06 UTC 2017
If you believe that a customer of a network service provider is in violation of that service providers AUP, you should email abuse at serviceprovider.net. Most large networks have a security team that monitors that email address regularly and will cooperate with you to address the problem.
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces at nanog.org] On Behalf Of Ronald F. Guilmette
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2017 1:50 PM
To: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: AS29073, 188.8.131.52/14, Level3: Why does anyone peer with these schmucks?
Sorry for the re-post, but it has been brought to my attention that my inclusion, in my prior posting, of various unsavory FQDNs resolving to various IPv4 addresses on AS29073 has triggered some people's spam filters. (Can't imagine why. :-) So I am re-posting this message now, with just a link to where those shady FQDNs and their current forward resolutions may be found. (I also took the opportunity to clean up some minor typos.)
I think that this is primarily Level3's problem to fix. But you be the judge. Please, read on.
Over the weekend, I stumbled upon an interesting blog calld "Bad Packets", where a fellow named Troy has written about various unsavory goings on involving various newtorks. One network that he called out in particular was AS29073, formerly called "Ecatel". on his blog, this fellow Troy has noted at length some break-in attempts originating from AS29073 and his inability to get anyone, in particular RIPE NCC, to give a damn.
The fact that RIPE NCC declined to accept the role of The Internet Police didn't surprise me at all... they never have and probably never will.
But I decided to have a quick look at what this newtork was routing, at present, which can be easily see here:
So I was looking through the announced routes for AS29073, and it all looked pretty normal... a /24 block, check, a /24 block, check, a /21 block check... another /24 block, and then ... WAIT A SECOND! HOLY MOTHER OF GOD! WHAT'S THIS??? 184.108.40.206/14 !!!
So how does a little two-bit network with a rather dubious reputation and a grand total of only about a /19 to its name suddenly come to be routing an entire /14 block??
And of course, its a legacy (abandoned) Afrinic block.
And of course, there's no reverse DNS for any of it, because there is no valid delegation for the reverse DNS for any of it... usually a good sign that whoever is routing the block right now -does not- have legit rights to do so. (If they did, then they would have presented their LOAs or whatever to Afrinic and thus gotten the reverse DNS properly delegated to their own name servers.)
I've seen this movie before. You all have. This gives every indication of being just another sad chapter in the ongoing mass pillaging of unused Afrinic legacy IPv4 space, by various actors with evil intent.
I've already documented this hightly unfortunate fad right here on multiple occasions:
This incident is a bit different from the others however, in that it -does not- appear that the 220.127.116.11/14 block has been filed to the brim with snowshoe spammers. Well, not yet anyway.
But if in fact the stories are correct, and if AS29073 does indeed have a history of hosting outbound hacking activities, then the mind reels when thinking about how much mischief such bad actors could get into if given an entire /14 to play with. (And by the way, this is a new world's record I think, for largest single-route deliberate hijack.
I've seen plenty of /16s go walkabout before, and even a whole /15.
But an entire /14?!?! That is uniquely brazen.)
In addition to the above, and the points raised within the Bad Packets blog (see links above) I found, via passive DNS, a number of other causes for concern about AS29073, to wit:
Shady FQDNs (incl possible child porn ones) on AS29073 moved here:
(In addition to the above, I've also found plenty more domain names associated with AS29073 which incorporate the names "Apple" "AirBnB", "Facebook", and "Groupon", as well as dozens of other legitimate companies and organizations.)
I confess that I have not had the time to look at any of the web sites that may or may not be associated with any of the above FQDNs, but the domain names themselves are certainly strongly suggestive of (a) the possible hosting of child porn and also and separately (b) the possible hosting of phishing sites.
So, given the history of this network (as is well documented on the Bad Packets blog) and given all of the above, and given what would appear to be the unauthorized "liberation" of the entire 18.104.22.168/14 block by AS29073, one cannot help but wonder: Why does anybody still even peer with these jerks?
The always helpful and informative web site bgp.he.net indicates that very nearly 50% of the connectivity currently enjoyed by AS29073 is being provided to them by Level3. I would thus like to ask Level3 to reconsider that peering arrangement in light of the above facts, and especially in light of what would appear to be the unauthorized routing of the 22.214.171.124/14 block by AS29073.
Surprisingly, given its history, AS29073 apparently has a total of 99 different peers, at present, and I would likewise ask all of them to reconsider their current peering arrangements with this network. I am listing all 99 peers below.
Before I get to that however, I'd like to also note that there currently exists, within the RIPE Routing Registry, the following route object:
I confess that I am not 100% sure of the exact semantics of the "mnt-routes"
tag, but it would appear from the above that the UK's M247 network (AS9009)...
which itself is not even peering with AS29073... appears to have, in effect countersigned the above RIPE route object, vouching for its correctness and authenticity as they did so. Why they would have done that, especially given that they themselves are not even peering with AS29073, is, I confess, beyond me. But I would love to have them explain it, or even try to explain it.
It's enigmatic, to say the least.
Anyway, the "created" date in the above record seems to be consistant with that actual start of the announcement of 126.96.36.199/14 by AS29073, which the RIPE Routing History tool says occured sometime in March of this year.
One additional (and rather bizzare) footnote to this whole story about the 188.8.131.52/14 block has to do with the entity that allegedly -is- the current rightful owner of the block (as far as Afrinic is concerned).
That entity is designated by the Afrinic handle ORG-IA41-AFRINIC and that in turn has an admin-c and tech-c of NAIT1-AFRINIC. The record for that handle is as follows:
person: Network and Information Technology Administrator
address: Unit 117, Orion Mall, Palm Street
address: Victoria, Mahe
address: Seychelles (SC)
e-mail: info at networkandinformationtechnology.com
changed: info at networkandinformationtechnology.com 20150725
Upon fetching the current WHOIS record for networkandinformationtechnology.com
I found it more than passing strange that all of the contact details therein are associated *not* with anything in Africa, nor even anything in the home country of AS29073 (Netherlands) but rather, the address and phone numbers therein all appear to be ones associated with a relatively well known Internet attorney in Santa Monica, Califiornia by the name of Bennet Kelly.
As it happens, in the distant past (about 10 years ago) I personally crossed swords with this particular fellow. He may be a lot of things, but it never seemed to me that stupid was one of them. And indeed the domain name networkandinformationtechnology.com and all of its connections to the 184.108.40.206/14 block appear to date from 2015...
long before AS29073 started routing this block (which only started in March of this year).
So, my best guess about this whole confusing mess is that the -original- legitimate owners of the 220.127.116.11/14 block most probably sold it on, in a legitimate transaction, to some other party in 2015, where that other party was/is represented by Mr. Bennet Kelly, Esq. And my guess is that neither he nor the new owners, who he represents, even know that their expensive /14 has gone walkabout, as of March of this year.
I will be trying to make contact with Mr. Kelley today to discuss this with him and will post a follow-up if any new and interesting information arises from that conversation.
Peers of AS29073:
1 Level 3 Communications, Inc.
2 REBA Communications BV
3 Hurricane Electric, Inc.
4 Core-Backbone GmbH
5 Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd.
6 RETN Limited
7 COLT Technology Services Group Limited
8 State Institute of Information Technologies and Telecommunications (SIIT&T "Informika")
9 GlobeNet Cabos Submarinos Colombia, S.A.S.
10 Digital Telecommunication Services S.r.l.
11 IT.Gate S.p.A.
12 green.ch AG
13 UNIDATA S.p.A.
14 GEANT Limited
15 IP-Max SA
16 Lost Oasis SARL
17 nexellent ag
18 SEACOM Limited
19 Angola Cables
20 ENTANET International Limited
21 Blix Solutions AS
22 POST Luxembourg
23 Zayo France SAS
24 Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA
25 Swisscom (Switzerland) Ltd
26 Pacnet Global Ltd
27 SURFnet bv
28 SEEWEB s.r.l.
29 BIT BV
30 euNetworks Managed Services GmbH
31 CAIW Diensten B.V.
32 netplus.ch SA
33 DOKOM Gesellschaft fuer Telekommunikation mbH
34 ADISTA SAS
35 Viewqwest Pte Ltd
36 Digital Ocean, Inc.
37 Digital Ocean, Inc.
38 Open Peering B.V.
39 Services Industriels de Geneve
40 Cemig Telecomunicaes SA
42 Vorboss Limited
43 equada network GmbH
44 Avantel, Close Joint Stock Company
45 Gyron Internet Ltd
46 IPROUTE SRL
47 LLC "TRC FIORD"
48 Hostserver GmbH
49 Telekommunikation Mittleres Ruhrgebiet GmbH
50 Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
51 Liquid Telecommunications Ltd
52 Paulus M. Hoogsteder trading as Meanie
53 Digiweb ltd
54 Fiberax Networking&Cloud Ltd.
56 CELESTE SAS
57 Kantonsschule Zug
59 SoftLayer Technologies Inc.
60 Network Platforms (PTY) LTD
61 Micron21 Datacentre Pty Ltd
62 Convergenze S.p.A.
63 Fiberby ApS
64 IP ServerOne Solutions Sdn Bhd,
65 Easynet Global Services
66 IP-Only Networks AB
67 Tango S.A.
68 Les Nouveaux Constructeurs SA
69 CustodianDC Limited
70 MCKAYCOM LTD
71 Daisy Communications Ltd
72 MC-IX Matrix Internet Exchange RS-1
73 NetIX Communications Ltd.
74 Anycast Global Backbone
75 LUXNETWORK S.A.
76 oja.at GmbH
77 Elisa Oyj
78 A1 Telekom Austria AG
79 Fusix Networks B.V.
80 ClaraNET LTD
81 "OBIT" Ltd.
82 Console Network Solutions Ltd
83 NetCologne GmbH
84 Tesonet Ltd
85 Linx Telecommunications B.V.
86 Strato AG
87 CJSC RASCOM
88 Sunrise Communications AG
89 KPN B.V.
90 MTN SA
91 Portlane AB
92 TM Net, Internet Service Provider
93 Network Dedicated SAS
94 Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH
95 Telkom SA Ltd.
96 ShockSRV Internet Services Private Limited
97 JUPITER 25 LIMITED
98 M-net Telekommunikations GmbH
99 Neterra Ltd.
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