BCP38 adoption "incentives"?
list at satchell.net
Tue Sep 27 12:31:24 UTC 2016
Does anyone know if any upstream and tiered internet providers include
in their connection contracts a mandatory requirement that all
directly-connected routers be in compliance with BCP38?
Does anyone know if large ISPs like Comcast, Charter, or AT&T have put
in place internal policies requiring
retail/business-customer-aggregating routers to be in compliance with BCP38?
Does any ISP, providing business Internet connectivity along with a
block of IP addresses, include language in their contracts that any
directly connected router must be in compliance with BCP38?
I've seen a lot of moaning and groaning about how BCP38 is pretty much
being ignored. Education is one way to help, but that doesn't hit
anyone in the wallet. You have to motivate people to go out of their
way to *learn* about BCP38; most business people are too busy with
things that make them money to be concerned with "Internet esoterica"
that doesn't add to the bottom line. You have to make their ignorance
SUBTRACT from the bottom line.
Contracts, properly enforced, can make a huge dent in the problem of
BCP38 adoption. At a number of levels.
Equipment manufacturers not usually involved in this sort of thing (home
and SOHO market) would then have market incentive to provide equipment
at the low end that would provide BCP38 support. Especially equipment
manufacturers that incorporate embedded Linux in their products. They
can be creative in how they implement their product; let creativity blossom.
I know, I know, BCP38 was originally directed at Internet Service
Providers at their edge to upstreams. I'm thinking that BCP38 needs to
be in place at any point -- every point? -- where you have a
significant-sized collection of systems/devices aggregated to single
upstream connections. Particular systems/devices where any source
address can be generated and propagated -- including compromised desktop
computers, compromised light bulbs, compromised wireless routers,
(That is one nice thing about NAT -- the bad guys can't build spoofed
packets. They *can* build, um, "other" packets...which is a different
(N.B.: Now you know why I'm trying to get the simplest possible
definition of BCP38 into words. The RFCs don't contain "executive
More information about the NANOG