Krebs on Security booted off Akamai network after DDoS attack proves pricey

John Kristoff jtk at
Sun Sep 25 17:00:21 UTC 2016

On Sun, 25 Sep 2016 14:36:18 +0000
Ca By <cb.list6 at> wrote:

> As long as their is one spoof capable network on the net, the problem will
> not be solved.

This is not strictly true.  If it could be determined where a large
bulk of the spoofing came from, public pressure could be applied.  This
may not have been the issue in this case, but in many amplification and
reflection attacks, the originating spoof-enabled networks were from a
limited set of networks.  De-peering, service termination, shaming, etc
could have an effect.


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