"Defensive" BGP hijacking?
justin at cloudflare.com
Wed Sep 21 03:26:52 UTC 2016
earlier on Twitter Krebs said he was hit by 665Gbps attack (so says
Prolexic/Akamai). Could be ongoing/related.
Head of Trust & Safety
PGP: BBAA 6BCE 3305 7FD6 6452 7115 57B6 0114 DE0B 314D
On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 8:21 PM, Mel Beckman <mel at beckman.org> wrote:
> While I was reading the krebsonsecurity.com article cited below, the site, hosted at Akamai address 188.8.131.52, became non responsive and now appears to be offline. Traceroutes stop before the Akamai-SWIPed border within Telia, as if blackholed (but adjacent IPs pass through to Akamai):
> traceroute to krebsonsecurity.com (184.108.40.206), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
> 1 router1.sb.becknet.com (220.127.116.11) 0.771 ms 0.580 ms 0.342 ms
> 2 206-190-77-9.static.twtelecom.net (18.104.22.168) 0.715 ms 1.026 ms 0.744 ms
> 3 ae1-90g.ar7.lax1.gblx.net (22.214.171.124) 9.532 ms 6.567 ms 2.912 ms
> 4 ae10.edge1.losangeles9.level3.net (126.96.36.199) 2.919 ms 2.925 ms 2.904 ms
> 5 telia-level3-4x10g.losangeles.level3.net (188.8.131.52) 3.981 ms 3.567 ms 3.401 ms
> 6 sjo-b21-link.telia.net (184.108.40.206) 11.209 ms 11.140 ms 11.161 ms
> 7 * * *
> 8 * * *
> 9 * * *
> 10 * * *
> Weird coincidence?
> -mel beckman
>> On Sep 20, 2016, at 6:46 PM, Hugo Slabbert <hugo at slabnet.com> wrote:
>> Lucy, you got some (*serious*) 'splainin to do...
>> Hugo Slabbert | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo at slabnet.com
>> pgp key: B178313E | also on Signal
>>> On Sun 2016-Sep-18 22:25:44 -0400, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>> So after reading your explanation of things...
>>> Your technical protections for your client proved sufficient to handle the
>>> attack. You took OFFENSIVE action by hijacking the IP space. By your own
>>> statements, it was only in response to threats against your company. You
>>> were no longer providing DDoS protection to a client. You were exacting a
>>> vendetta against someone who was being MEAN to you. Even if that person
>>> probably deserved it, you still cannot do what was done.
>>> I appreciate the desire to want to protect friends and family from
>>> anonymous threats, and also realize how ill equipped law enforcement
>>> usually is while something like this is occurring.
>>> However, in my view, by taking the action you did, you have shown your
>>> company isn't ready to be operating in the security space. Being threatened
>>> by bad actors is a nominal part of doing business in the security space.
>>> Unfortunately you didn't handle it well, and I think that will stick to you
>>> for a long time.
>>> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Bryant Townsend <bryant at backconnect.com>
>>>> @ca & Matt - No, we do not plan to ever intentionally perform a
>>>> non-authorized BGP hijack in the future.
>>>> @Steve - Correct, the attack had already been mitigated. The decision to
>>>> hijack the attackers IP space was to deal with their threats, which if
>>>> carried through could have potentially lead to physical harm. Although the
>>>> hijack gave us a unique insight into the attackers services, it was not a
>>>> factor that influenced my decision.
>>>> @Blake & Mel - We will likely cover some of these questions in a future
>>>> blog post.
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