Chinese root CA issues rogue/fake certificates

George William Herbert george.herbert at gmail.com
Wed Sep 7 23:39:14 UTC 2016




> On Sep 1, 2016, at 3:19 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer at nic.fr> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 11:36:57AM +1000,
> Matt Palmer <mpalmer at hezmatt.org> wrote 
> a message of 45 lines which said:
> 
>> I'd be surprised if most business continuity people could even name
>> their cert provider,
> 
> And they're right because it would be a useless information: without
> DANE, *any* CA can issue a certificate for *your* domain, whether you
> are a client or not.

It's relevant for a different reason; CA health needs to be monitored, and multiple CAs can (should) be used in case CA A's recognition gets pulled or a catastrophe happens.  Having certs from CA B then gets you going either immediately (if you actively use both) or rapidly (if you need to replace certs on web / services front end).  Getting new ones from CA B in a hurry can be a major deal.


Sent from my iPhone


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