Dyn DDoS this AM?

Alexander Lyamin la at qrator.net
Tue Oct 25 08:29:56 UTC 2016


Yeah, it sucked to be a Dyn customer that day.  However, if you had a
backup dns provider, it wasnt that bad.

You do realize that collateral effect scale  is a property of a target and
not attack?

My point was that implementing MANRS, while isn't covering all of the
spectrum of the attacks that made news this autumn will make at least some
of them if not impossible, but harder to execute.

And as I said - its work in progress.

P.S.  Jared Mauch notes regarding uRPF underperformance are correct, but it
only shows how rarely its actually used in a real life.  uRPF is more then
feasible in terms of algorithmical complexity, and this means that bugs can
be dealed with.



On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 7:30 AM, Ronald F. Guilmette <rfg at tristatelogic.com>
wrote:

>
> In message <CALoKGd15haJXthiT31Y_wk=-5UGLSRbusHv4b8btQ5nXv5Dmuw at mail.
> gmail.com>,
> Alexander Lyamin <la at qrator.net> wrote:
>
> >Its not a first time we have and large scale DDoS incident.
> >Its not a first time we have  (a kind of) knee-jerk reaction.
>
> I could be wrong, but I think its the first time I've turned
> on CNN and seen a "heat map" of the incident showing the entire
> NorthEast / New England area, all the way down to Washington,
> and parts of California all blanketed in red.
>
> So that part, at least, was, ya know, novel.
>
>
> Regards,
> rfg
>



-- 

Alexander Lyamin

CEO | Qrator <http://qrator.net/>* Labs*

office: 8-800-3333-LAB (522)

mob: +7-916-9086122

skype: melanor9

mailto:  la at qrator.net


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