Death of the Internet, Film at 11

Josh Reynolds josh at kyneticwifi.com
Sat Oct 22 23:01:31 UTC 2016


One sec, starting a relationship with $CPEvendor...

I'll let you know how this goes.

"Yes, every customer I went to had malware. That's okay, right?"

;)

On Oct 22, 2016 5:56 PM, "Mark Andrews" <marka at isc.org> wrote:

>
> In message <CAC6=tfYKBWBXMFHJo617q_qOMuOjEtoTDGK2pepfrMw3CybFuw@
> mail.gmail.com>
> , Josh Reynolds writes:
> >
> > And then what?
>
> They get in someone to clean up their network.  When they say it
> is clean you reconnect them.  If this happens more often than once
> a year you charge them a months fees per additional incident.  Have
> the year timer start when reconnect is requested.  You give them
> what data you have to backup the claim.
>
> > The labor to clean up this mess is not free. Who's
> > responsibility is it? The grandma who got a webcam for Christmas to watch
> > the squirrels? The ISP?... No... The vendor? What if the vendor had
> > released a patch to fix the issue months back, and grandma hadn't
> installed
> > it?
> >
> > Making grandma and auntie Em responsible for the IT things in their house
> > is likely not going to go well.
> >
>
> > Making the vendor responsible might work for the reputable ones to a
> point,
> > but won't work for the fly by night shops that will sell the same
> products
> > under different company names and model names until they get sued or "one
> > starred" into oblivion. Then they just change names and start all over.
> >
> > The ISPs won't do it because of the cost to fix... The labor and
> potential
> > loss of customers.
> >
> > So once identified, how do you suggest this gets fixed?
> >
> > On Oct 22, 2016 5:11 PM, "Mark Andrews" <marka at isc.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > One way to deal with this would be for ISP's to purchase DoS attacks
> > against their own servers (not necessarially hosted on your own
> > network) then look at which connections from their network attacking
> > these machines then quarantine these connections after a delay
> > period so that attacks can't be corollated with quarantine actions
> > easily.
> >
> > This doesn't require a ISP to attempt to break into a customers
> > machine to identify them.  It may take several runs to identify
> > most of the connections associated with a DoS provider.
> >
> > --
> > Mark Andrews, ISC
> > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> > PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka at isc.org
> >
> > --94eb2c030b6c594dc5053f7b994f
> > Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
> > Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
> >
> > <p dir=3D"ltr">And then what? The labor to clean up this mess is not
> free. =
> > Who's responsibility is it? The grandma who got a webcam for
> Christmas =
> > to watch the squirrels? The ISP?... No... The vendor? What if the vendor
> ha=
> > d released a patch to fix the issue months back, and grandma hadn't
> ins=
> > talled it?</p>
> > <p dir=3D"ltr">Making grandma and auntie Em responsible for the IT
> things i=
> > n their house is likely not going to go well.</p>
> > <p dir=3D"ltr">Making the vendor responsible might work for the
> reputable o=
> > nes to a point, but won't work for the fly by night shops that will
> sel=
> > l the same products under different company names and model names until
> the=
> > y get sued or "one starred" into oblivion. Then they just
> change =
> > names and start all over.</p>
> > <p dir=3D"ltr">The ISPs won't do it because of the cost to fix...
> The l=
> > abor and potential loss of customers.</p>
> > <p dir=3D"ltr">So once identified, how do you suggest this gets
> fixed?</p>
> > <div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Oct 22,
> 2016 5=
> > :11 PM, "Mark Andrews" <<a href=3D"mailto:marka at isc.org">
> marka=
> > @isc.org</a>> wrote:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote
> class=3D"quote"=
> >  style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
> solid;padding-left:1ex"><b=
> > r>
> > One way to deal with this would be for ISP's to purchase DoS
> attacks<br=
> > >
> > against their own servers (not necessarially hosted on your own<br>
> > network) then look at which connections from their network attacking<br>
> > these machines then quarantine these connections after a delay<br>
> > period so that attacks can't be corollated with quarantine
> actions<br>
> > easily.<br>
> > <br>
> > This doesn't require a ISP to attempt to break into a customers<br>
> > machine to identify them.=C2=A0 It may take several runs to identify<br>
> > most of the connections associated with a DoS provider.<br>
> > <font color=3D"#888888"><br>
> > --<br>
> > Mark Andrews, ISC<br>
> > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia<br>
> > PHONE: <a href=3D"tel:%2B61%202%209871%204742"
> value=3D"+61298714742">+61 2=
> >  9871 4742</a>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0
> =C2=
> > =A0INTERNET: <a href=3D"mailto:marka at isc.org">marka at isc.org</a><br>
> > </font></blockquote></div><br></div>
> >
> > --94eb2c030b6c594dc5053f7b994f--
> --
> Mark Andrews, ISC
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka at isc.org
>



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