Route leak in Bangladesh

Graham Beneke graham at
Tue Jun 30 15:45:32 UTC 2015

On 30/06/2015 17:09, Job Snijders wrote:
> If you were the network causing a leak of this type, prefix filters on
> inbound facing your customers might not have prevented this.
> If you are a network providing transit to the leak originator mentioned
> in the above paragraph, I believe a prefix based filter could have made
> a big difference.

We seem to be assuming that this leak occurred within the context of a
customer-provider BGP relationship.

But what if this is not the case?

What if this was a peering session - perhaps via a route server at an
exchange point. max-pref on a session with a route server is an
extremely blunt (and potentially ineffective) tool for the job.

In some regions the use to route servers and the lack of clue about
anything BGP beyond one session to the route server (and one session to
transit) is scary. We place our faith in the IXP operator, that they
know best, while there may be no evidence that they do... ;-)

Graham Beneke

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