Routing Insecurity (Re: BGP in the Washington Post)

Thu Jun 11 19:19:09 UTC 2015

On Thu, Jun 11, 2015 at 3:10 PM, David Mandelberg <david at mandelberg.org> wrote:
> On 2015-06-11 07:30, Russ White wrote:
>>>
>>> There have been suggestions that a key-per-AS is easier to manage than a
>>> key-per-router, like in provisioning.
>>
>>
>> Two points --
>>
>> First, if a single person with console access leaves the company, I must
>> roll the key for all my BGP routes, with the attendant churn, etc. I can't
>> imagine anyone deploying such a thing.
>
>
> I assume the vast majority of these cases are when the person leaves with no
> indication of malicious intent. In those cases, it might be possible to

it's actually nearly impossible to tell this... so the 'best' option
is to do the changes required as quickly as is safe for your network.

yes, it sucks... you know what sucks more? when 2 people leave on adjacent days.