de-peering for security sake

Mike Hale at
Sun Dec 27 19:49:15 UTC 2015

"really isn't a whole lot different from 'lock your damned doors and
windows' brick/mortar security."

Except it's *massively* more expensive.

On Sun, Dec 27, 2015 at 11:26 AM, Christopher Morrow
<morrowc.lists at> wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 27, 2015 at 1:59 PM,  <Valdis.Kletnieks at> wrote:
>> On Sun, 27 Dec 2015 05:35:19 +0100, Baldur Norddahl said:
>>> SSH password + key file is accepted as two factor by PCI DSS auditors, so
>>> yes it is in fact two factor.
>> They also accept NAT as "security".  If anything, PCI DSS is yet another example
>> of a money grab masquerading as security theater (not even real security).
> is it that? or is it that once you click the checkboxes on /pci audit/
> 'no one' ever does the daily due-diligence required to keep their
> security processes updated/running/current/etc ?
> I'm not a fan of the compliance regimes, but their goal (in a utopian
> world where corporations are not people and such) is the equivalent of
> the little posterboard person 42" tall before the roller-coaster
> rides, right?
> "You really, REALLY should have at least these protections/systems/etc
> in place before you attempt to process credit-card transactions..."
> In the utopian world this list would be sane, useful and would include
> daily/etc processes to monitor the security controls for issues... I
> don't think there's a process bit in PCI about: "And joey the firewall
> admin looks at his logs daily/hourly/everly for evidence of
> compromise" (and yes, ideally there's some adaptive/learning/AI-like
> system that does the 'joey the firewall admin' step... but let's walk
> before running, eh?)
> so, it's not really a mystery why failures like this happen.
>> I remember seeing a story a while ago that stated that of companies hit
>> by a data breach on a system that was inside their PCI scope, something
>> insane like 98% or 99% were in 100% full PCI compliance at the time of
>> the breach.  The only conclusion to be drawn is that the PCI set of checkboxes
>> are missing a lot of really crucial things for real security.  (And let's
>> not forget the competence level of the average PCI auditor, as the ones
>> I've encountered have all been very nice people, but more suited to checking
>> boxes based on buzzwords than actual in-deopth security analysis).
> people toss pci/sox/etc auditors under the bus 'all the time', and i'm
> guilty of this i'm sure as well, but really ... if you put systems on
> the tubes and you don't take the same care you would for your
> brick/mortar places ... you're gonna have a bad day. 'cyber security'
> really isn't a whole lot different from 'lock your damned doors and
> windows' brick/mortar security.
>> So excuse me for not taking "is accepted by PCI auditors" as grounds for
>> a claim of strong actual security.

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