Prefix hijacking, how to prevent and fix currently

Mon Sep 1 09:50:53 UTC 2014

Hi Tarun

Not really. People who are filtering route are filtering already since only
you have route object for it and people who are not filtering, for them
RIPE DB and whois won't matter.

On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Tarun Dua <lists at tarundua.net> wrote:

> Would it not help if RIPE un-publishes these ASN's from their whois
> database ?
>
> I filed the abuse report at RIPE but haven't heard back from them. We
> are NOT a RIPE member but an APNIC member.
>
> Regards
> -Tarun
>
> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 3:49 AM, Matthew Petach <mpetach at netflight.com>
> wrote:
> > On Sun, Aug 31, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Doug Madory <dmadory at renesys.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> Ah yes BusinessTorg (AS60937). I have also seen this one doing what you
> >> are describing. Not to MSFT or GOOG, but another major technology
> company
> >> that we peer with. In fact, it is going on right now but only visible if
> >> you receive routes directly from them. A while ago, I sent them a note
> >> describing what was happening and suggested they might want to stop
> >> accepting routes from that AS, but they still do.
> >>
> >
> >
> > Be aware that even if you don't think you're
> > peering with them directly, you may be picking
> > up routes via the public route servers at exchange
> > points, so check to see if you need to apply
> > filters on your route server peerings as well.
> >
> > Matt
>

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