Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]

Jason Bothe jason at rice.edu
Sun Nov 30 20:57:31 UTC 2014


I’m not new here but the thread caught my eye, as I am one of the lower ASs being mentioned.  I guess there isn’t really anything one can do to prevent these things other than listening to route servers, etc.  I guess it’s all on what the upstream decides to allow-in and re-advertise.

Jason

Jason Bothe, Manager of Networking

                               o   +1 713 348 5500
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				      jason at rice.edu




On 30, Nov 2014, at 2:37 PM, Jay Ashworth <jra at baylink.com> wrote:

> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Joe Provo" <nanog-post at rsuc.gweep.net>
> 
>> On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 12:53:07AM +0900, Paul S. wrote:
>>> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
>>> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
>> 
>> Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to
>> pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other
>> unfiltered noise, the only care is traffic going in and
>> out. QA (let alone automated sanity checks) are alien
>> concepts to many, and "well it works" is the answer from
>> some when contacted.
> 
> That's sort of the BGP equivalent to BCP38 filtering, isn't it?
> 
> Cheers,
> -- jra
> -- 
> Jay R. Ashworth                  Baylink                       jra at baylink.com
> Designer                     The Things I Think                       RFC 2100
> Ashworth & Associates       http://www.bcp38.info          2000 Land Rover DII
> St Petersburg FL USA      BCP38: Ask For It By Name!           +1 727 647 1274
> 



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