BGP Security Research Question

Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
Tue Nov 4 17:17:21 UTC 2014


On Tue, 04 Nov 2014 18:02:47 +0700, "Roland Dobbins" said:

> Networks which haven't implemented the BCPs sometimes find their BGP
> peering sessions disrupted via DDoS attacks against the routers
> themselves;   SYN-floods and the like against TCP/179 are sometimes used
> to disrupt BGP sessions in such scenarios, for example.  Aggressive
> scanning per the above against BGP speakers which haven't implemented
> the BCPs could result in inadvertent disruption of BGP sessions.

Am I the only guy wondering how many boxes out there are *still*
vulnerable to forged RST packets?
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