new DNS forwarder vulnerability

Jimmy Hess mysidia at gmail.com
Sat Mar 15 11:38:11 UTC 2014


On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:06 PM, Wayne E Bouchard <web at typo.org> wrote:


> Have we ascertained if there is a typical configuration adjustment
> that can be made to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of impact?
>

I think your best tactic is:  Provide specified DNS resolver cache servers.
Don't use CPEs for DNS forwarders.

The trouble is....  a CPE's  management/locally-bound IP address is in many
cases... often the same IP address that is a NAT address shared with user
traffic;  instead of a dedicated separate IP address that traffic can be
managed and security controlled.

Providing you ensure that the CPE's  IP bound address is not overloaded or
shared with user traffic ----  you might try  firewalling  destination port
53  to the CPE, except from   the proper upstream DNS resolvers,   since
nothing else should be "replying" to a DNS request made by the CPE.

Look into whether  the CPE can use a different,  lesser-used UDP port than
53  to forward DNS requests to;  use device firewall rules or upstream ACLs
to limit which source IP addresses can talk to the service on the CPE's IP.



To ascertain effectiveness for a specific CPE,  you would need to run a
sample exploit  with a before and after test.





> (From the description it sounds as though this is not possible but it
> doesn't hurt to ask.)
>

--
-JH


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