Hackers hijack 300, 000-plus wireless routers, make malicious changes | Ars Technica
iam at st-andrews.ac.uk
Tue Mar 4 18:33:46 UTC 2014
Until the average user's cpe is only permitted to use the resolvers one has provided as the provider (or otherwise decided are OK), this is going to be a game of whackamole. So long as there's an 'I have a clue' opt out, it appears to be the way forward to resolve this issue. Shutting down one set of 'bad resolvers' will simply cause a new set to be spawned, and a reinfection run round the still-unpatched cpe's of the world.
Sent from my phone, please excuse brevity and misspelling.
From: Octavio Alvarez<mailto:alvarezp at alvarezp.ods.org>
Sent: 04/03/2014 18:09
To: jim deleskie<mailto:deleskie at gmail.com>; Andrew Latham<mailto:lathama at gmail.com>
Cc: nanog at nanog.org<mailto:nanog at nanog.org>
Subject: Re: Hackers hijack 300, 000-plus wireless routers, make malicious changes | Ars Technica
On 03/04/2014 05:28 AM, jim deleskie wrote:
> Why want to swing such a big hammer. Even blocking those 2 IP's will
> isolate your users, and fill your support queue's.
When the malicious DNS services get shutdown you will still have your
support queue's filled, anyway.
Doing it now will let you identify those affected. Blockage doesn't have
to be all-or-nothing. It can be incremental, selective or all-or-nothing
on some time windows.
Better now than later.
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