Verizon Public Policy on Netflix
Matthew Kaufman
matthew at matthew.at
Tue Jul 15 16:45:49 UTC 2014
On 7/13/2014 12:54 PM, nanog at brettglass.com wrote:
>
> However, if there is any concern about either a Netflix server OR an
> ISP's cache being used to obtain illicit copies of the video, the
> solution
> is simple. This is a trivial problem to solve. Send and store the
> streams in
> encrypted form, passing a decryption key to the user via a separate,
> secured channel such as an HTTPS session. Then, it is not possible to
> obtain
> usable copies of the content by stealing either a Netflix server OR an
> ISP-owned cache. Problem solved.
Unless of course you've promised the content owner that you would be
encrypting each delivery with a different key (because they'd been
burned before by things like DVDs, which do not). Then not "problem
solved" at all.
You're also assuming that every customer is viewing the same
bitrate/resolution/aspect ratio. With multi-bitrate streaming, there's
often low overlap between the segments adjacent customers wish to
load... even if the content is not encrypted, or is encrypted with the
same DRM key for everyone.
Of course, the facts of the situation don't appear to matter really...
Matthew Kaufman
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