Verizon Public Policy on Netflix

Matthew Kaufman matthew at matthew.at
Tue Jul 15 16:45:49 UTC 2014


On 7/13/2014 12:54 PM, nanog at brettglass.com wrote:
>
> However, if there is any concern about either a Netflix server OR an
> ISP's cache being used to obtain illicit copies of the video, the 
> solution
> is simple. This is a trivial problem to solve. Send and store the 
> streams in
> encrypted form, passing a decryption key to the user via a separate,
> secured channel such as an HTTPS session. Then, it is not possible to 
> obtain
> usable copies of the content by stealing either a Netflix server OR an
> ISP-owned cache. Problem solved.

Unless of course you've promised the content owner that you would be 
encrypting each delivery with a different key (because they'd been 
burned before by things like DVDs, which do not). Then not "problem 
solved" at all.

You're also assuming that every customer is viewing the same 
bitrate/resolution/aspect ratio. With multi-bitrate streaming, there's 
often low overlap between the segments adjacent customers wish to 
load... even if the content is not encrypted, or is encrypted with the 
same DRM key for everyone.

Of course, the facts of the situation don't appear to matter really...

Matthew Kaufman


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